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Abstract 
 
One of the greatest post-conflict problems in South Sudan, which has emerged as 
a threat to the nation’s security, has been the deadly clashes between tribes during cattle 
raids. This thesis examines why cattle raiding shifted from a relatively non-violent rite of 
passage to the primary manifestation of tribal conflict in South Sudan, and whether it is 
possible to reverse this shift. This thesis proposes a unique approach to the topic by 
analyzing two underlying causes: insecurity in Jonglei State and a breakdown of 
traditional governance structures – as well as how their combination has led to the shift. 
This thesis focuses on a case study of Jonglei State, as it has experienced the largest 
number of instances of conflict attributed to cattle raiding in South Sudan. Furthermore, 
current attempts to reduce conflict through increased security and disarmament, 
demobilization, and reintegration programs have failed as they only address problems of 
insecurity. I will be comparing two periods of cattle raiding in Jonglei: the current 
conflict from 2009 until the present, and a historical review of cattle raids focusing on 
governance of the raids. The review will not cover any specific time period as it aims to 
identify what aspects of the tradition contributed to a reduced scale of violence before the 
shift in 2009. Insecurity has caused the increase in clashes, while disconnections to 
traditions have caused the increase in violence. To address these problems, traditional 
leadership structures and the de facto rules that structured raids must be re-established in 
order to produce a long-term solution. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
Entering its second year as an independent state, the Republic of South Sudan 
continues to face many internal security challenges. One of the greatest post-conflict 
problems in South Sudan, emerging as a primary threat to the nation’s security, has been 
the deadly clashes between tribes during cattle raids. Violence between tribes has been 
widespread among agro-pastoral communities in many South Sudanese states. However, 
this thesis will analyze the outbreak of tribal violence in Jonglei State, which is South 
Sudan’s largest territorial unit. With a population of over 1.3 million1 – and with 
approximately 80 percent dependent on the cattle economy2 – the outbreak of agro-
pastoralist conflicts in Jonglei has had a major impact on the population’s daily life. In 
particular, the violence in Jonglei has become highly personal; it has moved well beyond 
the theft of cattle carried out by youth as a rite of passage. Instead, current raiders attack 
and burn entire villages, targeting women, children, and the elderly.3  
Cattle raids in Jonglei have become cycles of violence among the three largest 
tribes in the state4: the Dinka, Lou-Nuer, and Murle. For this reason, my research 
examines why cattle raiding shifted from previously being a relatively non-violent rite of 
passage to the primary manifestation of tribal conflict in South Sudan, and if it is possible 
to reverse this shift. I will be taking a unique approach to the topic by analyzing two 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 International Crisis Group, “Jonglei’s Tribal Conflicts: Countering Insecurity in South Sudan,” Africa 
Report no. 154 (23 December 2009): i. 
2 Laura Heaton, “Root Causes of Violence in Jonglei State, South Sudan,” Enough Project video, 2:56 (17 
December 2012), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uTDm0ioYKHY&feature=player_embedded. 
3 Traditionally, raiding parties would solely target cattle. If conflict erupted, violence would be confined 
between raiders and cattle guards (youth who are responsible for guarding the cattle of the tribe). 
4 There are six tribes in Jonglei: the Dinka, Lou-Nuer, Gawaar-Nuer, Jikany-Nuer, Anyuak and the Murle. 
While there was conflict between the Lou-Nuer and the Jikany-Nuer in 2009, its scale was minor in 
comparison to the conflict among the Lou-Nuer, Murle, and Dinka. 
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underlying causes: insecurity in Jonglei State and a breakdown of traditional governance 
structures – as well as how their combination has led to the shift. Current efforts by local, 
national, and international actors to reduce the violence focus on addressing factors of 
insecurity in the region. While these issues must be addressed, the more pressing cause of 
violence is the lack of effective governance in Jonglei. When the traditional governance 
structures broke down, a void was created that the Government of South Sudan (GOSS) 
has failed to fill. Foundational services such as the rule of law and provision of security 
are virtually non-existent in Jonglei. Therefore, I will argue that insecurity has caused the 
increase in the number of clashes, while the breakdown of governance structures has 
caused the new, increased scale of violence.  
1.2 A United South? 
 When John Garang founded the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) on 
April 6th, 1983, its purpose was to create a “free, secular, democratic, and united society” 
within Sudan.5 Six weeks later, the 105th Battalion stationed at Bor6 revolted, leading to 
the start of the Second Sudanese Civil War.7 At its outset the SPLM - supported by its 
military wing the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) - sought to bring all groups in 
both the North and the South under its banner. For this reason the separation of the South, 
although supported by many within the SPLM/A command, was not one of the initial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Robert O. Collins, A History of Modern Sudan (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 141. 
6 Bor is currently the capital of Jonglei State. 
7 Then President of Sudan Ja’afar Nimeiri ordered all southern garrisons to be relocated to either the north 
or the west of Sudan. Nimeiri wanted to remove all military forces with southern loyalties from the region 
to eliminate any possible threat of revolt. In addition to questioning the loyalty of southern soldiers to the 
central government (as they had fought the Khartoum regime in the First Sudanese Civil War), Nimeiri had 
implemented several unpopular policies (including declaring Sudan an Islamic state), which imposed the 
regime’s power over the periphery regions. While the order was intended to bring stability to the region, 
Nimeiri’s order was used as part of the justification by the SPLM/A for the revolt. Collins, A History of 
Modern Sudan, 139. 
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goals of the civil war.8 The issue of separation was contentious, and led to rifts within the 
SPLM/A. 
 In addition to the issue of Southern separation, the growing absolute authority of 
John Garang over the SPLM/A increased animosities within the organization. Robert 
Collins has argued that the reason Garang maintained absolute control was because he 
was leading an army consisting of many personnel from different tribes who had, at one 
time or another, fought each other. According to Collins, being a ‘strong man’ allowed 
Garang to lead a divided group.9 However, John Garang could also be viewed as using 
his power as the leader of the SPLM/A to remove dissenting voices from the decision 
making process. The result was that all political and military decisions were made by 
Garang, and then carried out by his subordinates. The absence of a democratic process 
within the SPLM/A was given as the primary reason why senior SPLA commanders Riek 
Machar Teny Dhurgon, Gordon Kong Cuol, and Lam Akol Ajawin demanded the 
removal of John Garang as the SPLM/A leader on August 28, 1991.10 When the attempts 
to remove Garang failed, Riek Machar and Lam Akol broke away, creating the SPLA-
Nasir faction.  
 That November, in an attempt to defeat Garang in his home territory, the SPLA-
Nasir launched an attack on Bor and Kongor, located in the southwest corner of Jonglei 
State (see Figure 1) in Dinka territory.11 This major counteroffensive, known as the ‘Bor 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 There were many reasons why Garang did not create the SPLM/A as a secessionist movement. He 
personally believed that if the regime could be overthrown, Sudan could remain a united, secular 
democracy. Garang also had additional considerations: the tactical alliances with Northern anti-Nimeiri 
forces, support from regional countries (such as Ethiopia) fighting separatist movements of their own, and 
the difficulty of conceiving how to separate the North and South geographically and economically. 
Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars, 62. 
9 Collins, A History of Modern Sudan, 175. 
10 Ibid., 204. 
11 Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars, 98. 
	  	   4	  
Massacre,’ led to the indiscriminant death of Dinka civilians and the destruction of Bor.12 
While reports vary, estimates are that 2000 Dinka were killed in the attack.13 In addition 
to units consisting exclusively of Nuer soldiers, armed Nuer civilians known as the 
‘White Army’ supported the SPLA-Nasir during the massacre.14 The attack by an 
exclusively Nuer force on Dinka territory resulted in the formalization of tribal 
differences during the civil war.  
Figure 1: Map of the south of Sudan. Source: Robert O. Collins, A History of Modern Sudan (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 175. 
	  	  	   While the SPLM/A split in 1991 resulted in tribal divisions in the South, the initial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Collins, A History of Modern Sudan, 205. 
13 International Crisis Group, “Jonglei’s Tribal Conflicts: Countering Insecurity in South Sudan,” Africa 
Report no. 154 (23 December 2009): 3. 
14 The White Army was created to defend cattle and local communities during the civil war. 
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movement included members of various tribes. Douglas Johnson argues that the fairly 
even number of Dinka and Nuer commanders before the split demonstrates that the 
SPLM/A tried to overcome tribal divides - one of the remedies that Garang insisted was 
needed to unite Sudan.15 Therefore, Johnson argues that any divisions at the leadership 
level were based on personal and ideological differences. However, from the outset of the 
Second Civil War, the SPLM/A was generally perceived by outside groups and citizens 
as a ‘Dinka army’. Any group or tribe which opposed the SPLM/A could target local 
Dinka or Nuer tribes which were perceived as being the power base of the organization. 
 Recognizing an opportunity, the Khartoum government fanned the dissatisfactions 
of other tribal groups in the South to cause proxy wars and divert the SPLM/A’s attention 
from their northern campaigns.16 The SPLA-Nasir received supplies and support from 
Khartoum in order to combat the SPLM/A, which led to a quasi-alliance. That the SPLA-
Nasir strongly advocated for the secession of the South certainly made them strange 
bedfellows in the alliance with Khartoum, but it should be noted that arming factions in 
the South was not a new policy for the Khartoum government, which had also used the 
tactic in the First Sudanese Civil War (1955-1972). The Murle of Jonglei State, for 
example, have a long history of fighting their Dinka and Nuer neighbors with weapons 
and resources provided by Khartoum.17 As the Murle felt marginalized, the Sudanese 
government was able to manipulate the discontent among the Murle within only a couple 
of months of the Bor revolt in 1983.18 Throughout the civil war the Murle stronghold was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars, 65. 
16 While there was representation of Dinka and Nuer (the two largest tribes in the South) within the 
SPLM/A, smaller southern tribes were not included in the senior membership.  
17 Khartoum began using the Murle in the First Civil War, arming them to fight the Anyanya separatist 
group. The Murle were never disarmed and were therefore able to use the weapons in raids on Nuer and 
Dinka throughout the 1970s. Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars, 68. 
18 Ibid. 
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located in Pibor County (traditional Murle territory), in the southeast of Jonglei. Within 
the region, Ismail Konyi led the Murle Pibor Defence Force (MPDF) against SPLA 
forces, aided by resources from Khartoum.19 The SPLA, and later the GOSS, were never 
able to effectively establish control in Pibor due to Murle resistance. 
 The Dinka and Nuer populations in Jonglei were important sources of support and 
manpower for the SPLM/A. Therefore, by raiding the Dinka and Nuer populations, the 
Murle forced the creation of local security forces, drawing manpower away from the 
North-South conflict. Known as cattle guards, youth from local tribes were armed in 
order to protect local villages and cattle herds. The SPLA also targeted civilian 
populations perceived to be supporting tribal militias, hoping to reduce support for those 
militias and break supply and support chains.20 During 1985 and 1986, the SPLA 
campaigns involved attacks on Southern civilian populations it regarded as hostile 
towards the movement. The motive behind these attacks was to consolidate SPLA control 
in the Southern States and gain revenge against groups that targeted Dinka 
communities.21 Throughout the war, either the SPLM/A or the Khartoum government had 
armed the Dinka, Lou-Nuer, and Murle tribes. In addition, civilians from each tribe had 
been the targets of violence, causing animosity and mistrust towards surrounding tribes.  
 In January 2002, Machar and Garang formally reconciled, and re-united under the 
SPLM/A. The Second Civil War ended on January 9th, 2005 when the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed. The Southern Sudanese population had suffered 
terrible losses. By 2003, approximately 2 million Southern Sudanese had died, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 International Crisis Group, “Jonglei’s Tribal Conflicts: Countering Insecurity in South Sudan,” 5. 
20 Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars, 82. 
21 Ibid., 83. 
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anywhere from 4-6 million had fled from the South due to the constant fighting.22 
Although the South was granted autonomy in the CPA and had governed itself during the 
civil war, the SPLM/A was never able to establish exclusive control over the vast 
southern territory during the civil war. Areas throughout the South constantly alternated 
between control by the North and South. Where the SPLM/A failed to establish its 
control, tribal hierarchies provided the basis for governance. 
 Three events during the Second Civil War led to the formation of strong tribal 
stereotypes and resentments in the South. First, the split in the SPLM/A in 1991 led to a 
divide between the Dinka and Nuer that continued after the reconciliation of the factions. 
Additionally, the split resulted in the perception that the current Vice-President (and 
potential presidential candidate in 2015) Riek Machar did not fully support the cause of 
the South, as he had fought the SPLM/A and received support from Khartoum. This 
perception is particularly strong among the Dinka, who are also hostile towards Machar 
because of the Bor massacre. Second, the use of the Murle by the Khartoum government 
as a pawn in the war reinforced the perception that the Murle are ‘backward’, traitorous, 
and untrustworthy.23 Furthermore, the raids led to the arming of the Murle, Dinka, and 
Lou-Nuer, and none of the groups have been properly disarmed since the end of the war. 
Third, the SPLM/A’s inability to ‘win the hearts and minds’ of the civilian population in 
the South has caused fear of military involvement in civilian conflicts.24 The SPLA used 
force against civilians in the civil war; it also tends to have a heavy hand when dealing 
with outbreaks of inter-tribal violence. This has led to the perception among non-Dinka 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Collins, A History of Modern Sudan, 258. 
23 Jonah Leff, “My Neighbour, My Enemy: Inter-tribal violence in Jonglei,” Sudan Issue Brief No.21 
(October 2012): 6. 
24 Richard Rands and Matthew LeRiche, “Security Responses in Jonglei State in the Aftermath of Inter-
Ethnic Violence,” Saferworld (February 2012): 5. 
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populations that if the SPLM/A is deployed it might use violence to end the current 
cycles of raids.  
During the Second Civil War, the Dinka, Lou Nuer and Murle each came into 
conflict with one of their neighbours. The Murle raided both the Dinka and the Lou-Nuer 
throughout the civil war. On the other hand, relations between the Lou-Nuer and Dinka 
have tended to fluctuate. While the reconciliation between the SPLM/A and the SPLA-
Nasir led to a working relationship between the Dinka and the Nuer, the Bor massacre is 
still cited as a primary reason for tensions between the tribes. The events of the Second 
Civil War are not the sole cause of the current cycle of violence, but they continue to 
cause mistrust between tribes and are often used in rhetoric to incite action against a 
particular tribe. 
1.3 Insecurity and the Breakdown of Governance Structures 
Before analyzing the relationship between governance and insecurity, I will 
briefly touch on some of the key background issues needed to put the connection between 
these underlying causes into context. When South Sudan became independent on July 9th, 
2011, its secession from Sudan did not resolve many of the socio-political problems it 
was facing. Secession led to the South becoming an independent state, but the region 
already had a long history of being out of the Khartoum government’s control. In fact, 
throughout South Sudan’s history most imperial-colonial forces have failed to exercise 
their administration beyond a few stronghold cities.25 In the conflict and post-conflict 
reconstruction literature, it is noted that informal systems of governance are often created 
either in regions that lack a formal government, or where the government is unable to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Douglas H. Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars: Peace or Truce (Rochester, NY: James 
Currey, 2011), 9 
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exert its control. In Jonglei, the absence of a formal government led to a system in which 
tribes provided governance in lieu of the state. This governance ensured that there was a 
basic level of security for members of the tribe and predictability in their lives. Kenneth 
Menkaus argues that for this reason, regions such as Jonglei’s might be “without 
government, but not without governance.”26 With secession, citizens expected the GOSS 
to take on the roles that tribal systems have provided to the population. Currently, 
however, the GOSS has not developed the capacity to provide the most essential services 
needed by the population: security and governance.  
There has been a chronic lack of security and justice in Jonglei since the CPA was 
signed in 2005, which marked the end of the Second Sudanese Civil War. This is due to 
three key reasons. First, the events of the civil war caused a breakdown in the system of 
tribal governance. Youth, the primary source of manpower during the civil war, were 
often relocated to various regions outside traditional governance structures as a result of 
wartime operations. Upon their return, they often challenged and resisted these structures. 
In addition, external relations between different tribes in the region collapsed as they 
often took different sides during the civil war. Second, the GOSS has failed to effectively 
transition into the roles previously held by tribal groups. This has led to a vacuum in the 
provision of security and predictability in the lives of the Dinka, Lou-Nuer and Murle. 
Third, the GOSS has been unable to establish an effective justice system. Formally, cattle 
raiding in South Sudan is illegal. However, raiders are rarely arrested or criminally tried. 
Furthermore, the GOSS has been unable to establish an effective police or security force 
to combat many of the sources of insecurity within the state.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Kenneth Menkhaus, “Somalia: Governance vs. Statebuilding,” in Building States to Build Peace, ed. 
Charles T. Call with Vanessa Wyeth (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2008): 188. 
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The question that this thesis addresses is why cattle raiding shifted from a non-
violent rite of passage to the primary manifestation of tribal conflict in South Sudan, and 
whether the situation can be reversed. Insecurity, or lack of human security, felt among 
the population in South Sudan has caused the increase in clashes because – as 
demonstrated by the ‘parable of the tribe’ theory in Chapter 3 – tribal groups fear the 
actions that could be taken by a neighboring tribe and therefore respond to any potential 
threat with hostility. Furthermore, violent clashes between tribes during cattle raids are 
due to the fact that the youth participating in the raids are disconnected from the tradition 
in which they are participating. There has been both a breakdown of traditional leadership 
structures, as well as a trend amongst those who are participating in the tradition to not 
follow the de facto rules that formerly structured the raids. This is most clearly seen in 
the lack of respect given to tribal elders, who were previously able to facilitate the 
practice and acted as the primary mediators to diffuse the conflict before it escalated. 
Therefore, there are two causal mechanisms that will be applied in this thesis (see Figure 
2). First, it will be argued that insecurity has caused an increase in clashes between tribal 
groups. Second, when these clashes occur, the breakdown of traditional governance 
structures has caused the increased scale of violence. If the insecurity within South Sudan 
were to be addressed, the number of clashes between the tribes would decrease. If the 
traditional governance structures, or hybrid systems (as will be discussed in Chapter 6), 
were reintroduced through the restoration of formerly de facto rules and elder influence, 
then the levels of violence would decrease.  
In order to explain the shift in the scale of violence seen in cattle raiding from 
2009-2012, this thesis proposes a re-evaluation of the approach to examining the 
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underlying causes of the conflict in Jonglei: studying the linkage between insecurity and 
the breakdown of governance. Research on the conflict derived from cattle raids has 
focused on analyzing the sources of insecurity as the cause of increased violence in 
Jonglei. Given that the current literature examining sources of insecurity have used the 
concept broadly and in order to maintain congruency, this thesis will therefore define 
insecurity as any threat to human security. Human security at its most basic level is the 
ability of individuals to be free from violence and fear. While traditional security studies 
experts criticize the human security approach as being too broad,27 this approach places 
the focus on individuals, who are the primary victims within Jonglei State.  
Figure 2: Relationship between Insecurity and Governance 
 
 
The way in which insecurity has been defined in Jonglei has stretched the 
concept, allowing the inclusion and exclusion of a variety of factors. These sources of 
insecurity include: the economics of bridewealth, environmental effects on grazing lands 
and migration, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW), lack of 
infrastructure, political interest in the conflict, and the failure of the security sector to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Fathali M. Moghaddam, The New Global Security: how terrorism, environmentalism, collapse, economic 
inequalities, and resource shortages are changing out world (Denver, CO: Praeger Security International, 
2010), 6. 
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respond to conflicts. This is not an exhaustive list, as the dynamics within the state are 
constantly changing, leading to the constant re-evaluation of factors and their effect on 
insecurity. Therefore, an analysis of the most consistent factors of insecurity in Jonglei – 
bridewealth, environmental factors, and SALW – in Chapter 5 will demonstrate that these 
factors, which have increased the levels of insecurity in the state, led to an increase in 
clashes rather than a direct increase in the scale of violence. Previously, clashes between 
tribes tended to occur primarily during the dry seasons, as tribes would migrate to find 
grazing lands. The clashes were fairly predictable, to the extent that “tribes knew 
precisely when and where they would encounter neighboring tribes.” 28  Given the 
predictability of clashes, actions could be taken within the traditional leadership 
structures to mitigate the conflict. However, with the changing dynamics within Jonglei, 
insecurity within the state has led to shifts in the daily lives of the tribes. This shift has 
led to more frequent confrontations between the Dinka, Lou-Nuer, and Murle.  
Furthermore, sources of insecurity felt by the different tribal groups do not 
necessarily have to be ‘real’; they can also be perceived. If an individual or tribe 
perceives that it is threatened, and that the government does not mitigate the threat, then 
it will seek an alternative source of security. Since within Jonglei the government does 
not have a monopoly on violence, security is found instead within the tribal structure. If 
an outside force is perceived to threaten a tribe, then its leaders will act to eliminate that 
threat. Therefore, violence can be caused by perceptions as well as actual threats to 
security.  Insecurity felt by the population in Jonglei has caused the increase in clashes 
because tribal groups fear the potential actions that could be taken by a neighboring tribe. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Leff, “My Neighbour, My Enemy: Inter-tribal violence in Jonglei,” 6. 
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With the breakdown of relations between tribes, one of the only options to ensure that a 
group is not attacked is to eliminate the threat, and therefore attack first.  
While research on the conflict in Jonglei has included the breakdown of 
governance structures within the explanation of underlying causes, there is no consensus 
on the way that governance has affected the conflict. The breakdown in governance has 
tended to be included as one source of insecurity.29 However, I would argue that the 
breakdown of traditional governance is directly and significantly related to the increase in 
violence in Jonglei and must be addressed separately. Traditional governance managed 
tribal affairs locally, as well as relations between neighboring tribes. This established 
system gave structure to a region with minimal formal government power. Codes of 
conduct were adhered to in daily life, including during raids. Given these rules, there was 
predictability in the interactions within tribes and between two different tribes. If these 
codes were broken, individuals would be held accountable by the tribal leadership, and 
faced being shunned by the community if they did not follow the ruling of the elders and 
chiefs. Therefore, traditional governance motivated adherence to rules that were enforced 
if broken. However, when these traditional systems broke down, there was no 
enforcement of the rules that dictated conduct between tribes. Therefore, raiders were 
able to break these rules and were not held to account.   
The importance of governance in reducing violence during cattle raids is clearly 
seen in the response to the cattle raids in Unity, Warrap, and Lakes states (see figure 1, 
where Warrap State is labeled as Warad - an alternative spelling of the state). A pattern of 
clashes similar to the cycles of conflict in Jonglei has been experienced among Unity, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 “People’s Perspectives on Peace-making in South Sudan: An initial assessment of insecurity and 
peacebuilding responses in Jonglei State,” Saferworld (September 2011): 3. 
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Warrap, and Lakes states; however this violence is minor compared to the scale seen in 
Jonglei. These conflicts differ from those in Jonglei as the cycles of raids cross state 
borders, concentrated particularly on raids occurring between Lakes and Warrap states, as 
well a cycle of violence between Unity State and Warrap State. The raids assume a 
cyclical nature, crossing the bordering regions of each state and creating a triangle of 
conflict. In addition, as in the case of Jonglei, the power of elders in Unity, Warrap, and 
Lakes states has deteriorated since the civil war, greatly reducing their ability to act as 
mediators in the resolution of conflicts between bordering tribes.30 However, what made 
the circumstance in Unity, Warrap, and Lakes states different when compared to Jonglei 
is that the political leaders representing Unity, Warrap, and Lakes states have made 
ending conflicts between their states a top priority.  
Members of Parliament for Unity, Warrap, and Lakes states have worked to return 
all stolen cattle to their original tribes and prosecute those responsible for theft.31 Efforts 
by state officials has led to accountability for actions taken during cattle raids, removing 
the culture of impunity in Unity, Warrap, and Lakes states that is rampant in Jonglei. 
Furthermore, during a conference from June 17-19, 2013, the Governors of Lake, Unity 
and Warrap states agreed to increase security measures to prevent cross border raids. This 
has included the possibility of imposing the death penalty on individuals accused of 
raiding cattle across state borders.32 While the measure must still be passed by each state 
parliament, the emphasis on standardizing punishment across the three states indicates 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 “People’s Perspectives on Peace-making in South Sudan: An initial assessment of insecurity and 
peacebuilding responses in Warrap State,” Saferworld (September 2011), 6. 
31 “Lakes & Unity MPs agree to recover stolen cattle,” Miraya. (21 May 2013). 
http://www.radiomiraya.org/news-202/south-sudan/11299-lakes-unity-mps-agree-to-recover-stolen-
cattle.html#gsc.tab=0. 
32 “Three South Sudan state agree to impose the death penalty on cattle raiders” (19 June 2013) 
http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article47022. 
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that all raiders will be treated equally, removing any possibility of preferential treatment 
from their home jurisdiction. While the death sentence might be removed from the 
agreement, the legalization and standardization of bloodwealth33 compensations at 51 
cattle for each victim is likely to reduce violence as gains from raids would be negated.34 
This example demonstrates that in Unity, Warrap, and Lakes states, members of the 
GOSS were able to fill the void caused by the breakdown of traditional governance 
structures, reducing the level of violence. By adopting measures such as bloodwealth that 
were deeply rooted in traditional tribal governance, the GOSS introduced an indigenous 
solution35 to the conflict, ending the culture of impunity. 
Cattle raiding, as a source of tribal conflict in South Sudan, has become one of the 
greatest post-independent threats to domestic security. For this reason international, 
government, and non-governmental actors have been working to find ways to curb the 
violence that has occurred during raids. Thus far, efforts have focussed on mass 
disarmament campaigns, reforming the security sector, providing security forces around 
large herds of cattle, and establishing a national reconciliation commission. These 
examples are not exhaustive, however, and these efforts to address these sources of 
insecurity will only reduce the incidence of clashes. For example, if rearmament occurs 
or if herds are not protected, raids will continue – and have continued – to occur. The 
underlying reasons for the conflict are not properly understood and therefore long term 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Bloodwealth is the payment of cattle to a family or tribe in compensation for ‘wrongdoing’ or crime. 
This concept will be covered in more detail in Chapter 4. 
34 Ibid. 
35 As discussed in Chapter 4, an indigenous solution is something that is locally inspired, but does not 
necessarily have to be a traditional approach. While bloodwealth is a tradition, ensuring fixed 
compensation reflects a new approach to the tradition. 
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solutions cannot be devised. Therefore the issue of governance must become a top 
priority in addressing the conflict in Jonglei State. 
1.4 Features of the Thesis 
The remaining thesis will be broken down into five chapters. Chapter Two will 
explain the cyclical conflict unfolding in Jonglei State. It will start off with a brief 
explanation of the tradition of cattle raiding, moving into the explanation of the shifts that 
have occurred in this tradition. The rest of the chapter is broken down into a description 
of the different cycles of conflicts between the Dinka, Lou-Nuer, and Murle.   
Chapter Three will focus on why the conflict in Jonglei can be described as a 
tribal conflict, why there is a persistence of tribal structures in modern states, and what 
explanatory factors can be introduced to interpret the cycles of violence among the 
Dinka, Lou-Nuer and Murle. The chapter will also delve into the debate on how to define 
a tribe, when or why the term is used, and some of the controversies involved with using 
the term tribe. The research question for this thesis is located within a polarized debate in 
the ethnic conflict literature, in which the term ‘tribal’ is considered both a proper 
descriptor for a conflict that satisfies certain criteria, and a term that defines a conflict as 
intractable. The chapter will end with the ‘Parable of the Tribe’, that will be used to 
explain the cyclical nature of the conflict in Jonglei. Since the ‘Parable of the Tribe’ is a 
thought process to which I will apply a practical case, I will address some of its shortfalls. 
The parable properly explains the cyclical nature of the current conflict in Jonglei, as well 
as the potential for the conflict to spiral and escalate. My additions will primarily 
examine the impact of outside actors on the cyclical nature of the conflict described in the 
parable, as well as the effect of cooperation and mediation on bringing an end to the 
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conflict. This chapter covers key definitions, concepts and theories, and therefore will 
also serve as a review of the relevant literature on the topic. 
Chapter Four is a review of the tradition of cattle raiding in the Dinka, Lou-Nuer, 
and Murle tribes, focusing on governance of the raids. The review compares aspects of 
the traditions in each of the tribes, identifying those traditions that could be re-introduced 
to reduce the scale of violence. The review will not cover any specific time period as it 
aims to identify what aspects of the tradition contributed to a reduced scale of violence 
before the shift in 2009. 
Chapter Five will cover the main causes of insecurity in Jonglei State. Economic 
instability is a key factor that has added to insecurity, especially among young men who 
need cattle for bridewealth payments. If there are no alternatives to obtaining the wealth 
needed for bridewealth payment, one of the ways that this wealth can be gained is 
through cattle raiding. The increase in the number of raids has led to an increase in the 
number of encounters between tribes. Environmental factors also have to be considered, 
as tribes in Jonglei must look for water, and grazing lands for cattle, which is increasingly 
threatened. The final source of insecurity covered in Chapter Five is the effect of small 
arms and light weapons (SALW), as the proliferation of arms is often cited as one of the 
greatest threats to security in Jonglei. There are many other sources of insecurity that 
could be included in the analysis of Chapter Five. For Example, the lack of infrastructure, 
including transportation and roads, has added to insecurity as government security forces 
have difficulty reaching some of the areas in which conflict occurs. Therefore, if one 
group were to raid another, it is likely that the former would be able to leave with the 
stolen cattle before security forces were deployed. However, bridewealth, environmental 
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changes, and the proliferation of SALW are considered the main causes of insecurity in 
Jonglei. Furthermore, each of the sources of insecurity included in Chapter 5 
demonstrates the importance of traditional governance structures, as the structures 
historically reduced insecurity caused by bridewealth and environmental factors.  
 Finally, Chapter Six will conclude the thesis by examining the potential for 
instituting a hybrid solution that could address the lack of governance in Jonglei. Current 
attempts to address the problems in Jonglei have focused on instituting solutions that fall 
within an operational model of post-conflict reconstruction. This approach has led actors 
to address conflict in Jonglei with a ‘best practice’ model, instituting programs that have 
proven to work in other post-conflict states. This has included solutions such as 
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programs; security sector reform; civilian 
disarmament; and peace conferences. The implementation of these programs often 
focuses on pleasing donors, leading to a donor-driven model for post-conflict 
reconstruction in which programs must be implemented in order to receive funding. This 
proves problematic, as better ways to address the problem can be overlooked. I will 
conclude with suggesting that moving forward, local, national, and international actors 
will need to implement a hybrid form of post-conflict reconstruction. This involves 
consultations, implementation, and buy-in from all relevant actors. In terms of 
governance, a hybrid system would involve overlapping authority in Jonglei between the 
GOSS and tribal structures, one complementing the deficiencies of the other. 
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Chapter 2: The Cyclical Conflict in Jonglei 
2.1 Traditional Cattle Raids 
The conflict in Jonglei is described by a notable variety of terms. The GOSS has 
tended to refer to the cycles of violence as inter-tribal conflict; emphasizing tribal divides 
as a cause of violence. The terms inter-communal and agro-pastoral violence have each 
been used by non-governmental organizations (NGOs), while news organizations have 
described the conflict as cattle raids or cattle rustling. Although each of these terms 
describes the conflict in Jonglei differently, they all refer to the same cycle of clashes 
between tribes. The conflict originated from the tradition of cattle raiding. Raids occur 
when individuals or groups steal cattle from a neighboring tribe in order to gain prestige 
and expand the size of their herd.36 The process was traditionally relatively non-violent, 
and the tribe whose cattle were stolen would eventually conduct a counter-raid. These 
raids and counter-raids were minor in impact in comparison to current cycles of violence; 
the raiding party was small, it travelled on foot, and used spears as weapons. All these 
factors resulted in the theft of only a small number of cattle during raids. If conflict 
occurred during traditional raids, it was confined to the raiders and cattle herders, as they 
were all “men of fighting age” and only a threat to each other.37 The surrounding 
community was rarely involved, as it was not perceived as a threat or appropriate target.  
2.2 Shifts in Cattle Raiding 
The current cycle of conflict in Jonglei, beginning with the January 2009 raids by 
the Murle on the Lou-Nuer, has greatly escalated. Larger groups conduct raids on a scale 
only observed during the Bor Massacre. Raiders are more organized, coordinating their 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 International Crisis Group, “Jonglei’s Tribal Conflicts: Countering Insecurity in South Sudan,” 1. 
37 Leff, “My Neighbour, My Enemy: Inter-tribal violence in Jonglei,” 2. 
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activities using new technologies such as satellite phones.38 The proliferation of small 
arms and light weapons has led to an increase in casualties when clashes occur. The 
current tactics allow raiders to steal more cattle, which leads to a reciprocally escalated 
response during counter-raids. Furthermore, herders are more inclined to increase the 
scale of violence in hopes of dissuading any additional retaliatory response, reclaiming 
their stolen cattle, and stealing cattle as compensation.  
Due to the lack of prosecution for raids and no bloodwealth compensation,39 
counter-raids have allowed the victimized tribes in Jonglei to seek ‘justice’ for previous 
thefts and deaths. Bloodwealth is an important tradition, as any ‘wrongdoing’ once 
resulted in compensation in the form of cattle.40 Due to the importance of cattle for the 
tribes in Jonglei, incidents of violence were reduced since cattle had to be given as 
bloodwealth, negating any previous gains from raids. The movement away from this 
system has led to a great increase in the level of destruction.41 While cattle remain the 
primary focus of the current string of conflicts, all members of the tribal community are 
now targets for violence by raiders. Furthermore, attacks have been carried out in such a 
way that maximum damage is done to the community by increasing the number of cattle 
stolen in each counter-raid, attacking all members of the community, burning community 
structures, and destroying infrastructure and the source of livelihoods during raids.42 The 
shift to targeting civilians has led to the conflict being reframed in communal and tribal 
dimensions, as the entire group and its way of life is now susceptible to violence.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Ibid., 6. 
39 The importance of bloodwealth will be explained in more detail in Chapter 4, particularly in regards to 
the role it has as compensation for crimes. 
40 International Crisis Group, “Jonglei’s Tribal Conflicts: Countering Insecurity in South Sudan,” 1. 
41 Leff, “My Neighbour, My Enemy: Inter-tribal violence in Jonglei,” 5. 
42 United Nations Mission in South Sudan, “Incidents of Inter-Communal Violence in Jonglei State,” 
United Nations Mission in South Sudan (June 2012): 7. 
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2.3 Cyclical Conflict Between the Dinka and Lou-Nuer 
Each of the cycles of conflict originated at different times and for different 
reasons. While it is usually difficult to determine the exact attack that started the cycle, 
there are fairly strong indications which major clashes fueled the conflict (see table 1). 
The most recent conflict between the Dinka and the Lou-Nuer can be traced to a raid that 
occurred in Duk County in May 2007 (see figure 3). The Dinka were able to raid some 
20,000 cattle from the Lou-Nuer; however, there were no deaths reported. Cattle in the 
pastoral regions are each worth about $400-500 South Sudanese Pounds (SSP). 43 
Therefore, the stolen herd was worth anywhere from 8-10 million SSP (equivalent to 1.8-
2.27 million USD). Given that over 90% of the population in South Sudan lives on the 
equivalent of a dollar per day, the theft was very substantial.44  Although cattle are not 
sold on a regular basis, they are considered savings that can be used when needed. The 
Lou-Nuer strongly believed that the government failed to properly investigate the raid, as 
they only recovered 300-800 cattle, and cite this incident as one of the key grievances 
fuelling future conflict with the Dinka.45 Small-scale raiding occurred throughout 2007 to 
2009; however, the Lou-Nuer responded to the May 2007 Dinka raid two years later in 
August and September 2009.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Matt Richmond and Flavia Krause-Jackson, “Cows-for-Bride Inflation Spurs Cattle theft Among the 
Mundari in South Sudan,” Bloomberg News, July 29, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-07-
26/cows-for-bride-inflation-spurs-cattle-theft-among-mundari-in-south-sudan.html. 
44 UNICEF in South Sudan, “Children in South Sudan,” 3. http://www.unicef.org/esaro/Children 
_in_Sudan_summary_sheet_final.pdf 
45 The response on how many cattle were stolen varied. International Crisis Group, “Jonglei’s Tribal 
Conflicts: Countering Insecurity in South Sudan,” 3. 
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Figure 3: Map of Jonglei State. Source: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs, “Jonglei State map,” Reference Maps. http://www.unocha.org/south-sudan/maps-
graphics/administrative-maps. 
	  
The delay between major clashes was partly due to the disarmament of Lou-Nuer 
that occurred throughout January-May 2006.46 The disarmament caused vulnerability in 
the Lou-Nuer territories, as it was the only population to be disarmed, and the Dinka raid 
in May 2007 took advantage of the inability of the Lou-Nuer to defend themselves. The 
May 2007 raid caused the Lou-Nuer to rearm out of a need to protect themselves as the 
government had proven unable to do so after tribal disarmament. When the Lou-Nuer 
conducted retaliatory attacks on Wernyol in August and Duk Padiet in September 2009, 
these attacks did not involve the theft of cattle. The attacks focused on administrative 
centers – a clear response to the lack of government reaction in May 2007.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Disarmament as a source of insecurity will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. 
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Table 1: Major Tribal Clashes in Jonglei State 
Date of attack Perpetrating 
tribe 
Victim of 
attack 
Location Estimated 
Deaths 
Estimated 
Cattle Stolen 
May 2007 Dinka Lou-
Nuer 
Duk N/A 20,000 
January 2009 Murle Lou-
Nuer 
Akobo County 300 N/A 
February 18, 
2009 
Murle Lou-
Nuer 
Akobo County 250 N/A 
March 5-8, 
2009 
Lou-Nuer Murle Likuangole and Pibor 
County 
450 600 
August 2009 Lou-Nuer Dinka Wernyol and 
Panyangor 
42 N/A 
Sept 2009 Lou-Nuer Dinka Duk padiet 167 N/A 
February 6, 
2011 
Murle Lou-
Nuer 
Uror County 8 (3 Nuer 
Chiefs) 
1000 
April 18-24, 
2011 
Lou-Nuer Murle Likuangole and Pibor 
County 
200 138,000 
June 15-24, 
2011 
Lou-Nuer Murle Gumuruk, 
Likuangole, and 
Pibor County 
400 398,000 
August 18, 
2011 
Murle Lou-
Nuer 
Pieri and Uror 
County 
750 38,000 
December 2011 Murle Dinka Jale 42 N/A 
December 23, 
2011 – January 
9, 2012 
Lou-Nuer Murle Likuangole, Pibor, 
and Pibor County 
1000 100,000 
January 2012 Murle Dinka Duk 47 200 
December 27, 
2011 – 
February 4 
2012 
Murle Lou-
Nuer and 
Dinka 
Akobo, Nyirol, and 
Uror Counties 
276 60,000 
February 2012 Dinka Murle Bor 9 N/A 
March 2, 2012 Murle Lou-
Nuer 
Nyirol County 15 15,000 
March 9-11, 
2012 
Murle Lou-
Nuer 
Ethiopia (Wanding 
Payam) 
225 20,000 
Compiled from Sources: Jonah Leff, “My Neighbour, My Enemy: Inter-tribal violence in Jonglei,” Sudan 
Issue Brief No.21 (October 2012): 3.; Agereb Leek Chol, “Jonglei state Conflict Analysis: Why Second 
Disarmament Is Not a Solution.” South Sudan News Agency, March 18, 2012. 
http://www.southsudannewsagency.com/opinion/analyses/jonglei-state-conflict-analysis-why-second-
disarmament-is-not-a-solution.; International Crisis Group, “Jonglei’s Tribal Conflicts: Countering Insecurity 
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2.4 Cyclical Conflict between the Lou-Nuer and Murle 
While the conflict between the Dinka and Lou-Nuer peaked in 2009, the clashes 
between the Lou-Nuer and Murle then began, bringing a new level of violence to the 
conflict. In January 2009, a Murle attack on the Lou-Nuer in Akabo County was seen as 
breaking in a perceived ‘pledge for peace’ negotiated by Vice-President Riek Machar in 
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early 2009 between both tribes.47 Part of the pledge, according to the Lou-Nuer, was the 
freedom to migrate into Murle territory. This is a major point of contention, as the Murle 
strongly objected that migration was not part of the negotiated agreement. It is difficult to 
determine what was guaranteed as Riek Machar acted as a shuttle negotiator between 
both tribes. Therefore, it is possible that the Murle and the Lou-Nuer were given different 
versions of the agreement. Regardless, the peace was broken, resulting in great mistrust 
between the Murle and the Lou-Nuer.  
In response, the Lou-Nuer attacked Likuangole from March 5-8th, 2009, killing 
450 Murle, mostly women and children.48 In addition, Lou attackers also stole 600 head 
of cattle during the raid. The retaliation by the Lou-Nuer is cited by Small Arms Survey 
Sudan (SASS) as the major clash that caused the cycle of violence with the Murle.49 In 
order to take this position, the SASS would have to justify why the Murle attack, which 
resulted in the death of 300 Lou-Nuer, is not considered the beginning of the cycle. While 
the purpose of the Murle attack was to demonstrate that the Lou-Nuer could not enter 
their territory freely, this should not exonerate the Murle. Rather, I would argue that the 
cycle began with the Murle raid, but was escalated by the Lou-Nuer.  
The Murle and the Lou-Nuer have claimed that they are each the victims of an 
initial attack, and used the rhetoric of victimhood to justify their actions. While both 
tribes were the victims of violent clashes, both were undeniably perpetrators as well. The 
first attack by the Murle was aggressive and broke the spirit of the negotiated peace. 
However, given the spirit of the pledge for peace, the Lou-Nuer could have decided 
against any retaliation. Perhaps more realistically, the Lou could have chosen to respond 	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in kind. The former would have indicated a willingness to address the raiding problem 
through dialogue rather than violence, while the latter would have resulted in a scaled or 
symmetrical retaliation. However, the Lou-Nuer not only launched a counter-raid, they 
greatly increased the scale of destruction. In addition to 450 deaths, there were “over 150 
injured, 200 women and children abducted, and over 5,000 displaced.”50 For this reason, 
Richard Rands and Matthew LeRiche believe that the Lou-Nuer attack represented an 
increase in the scale of violence.  
The response by the Lou-Nuer led to a tit-for-tat strategy during the following two 
years.51 In each case, a victimized tribe would only respond to the hostile actions of 
another. This allowed the scale of the conflict to increase or decrease depending on the 
circumstances within the state. Therefore, from February 2009 until February 2011, there 
was a reduction in the scale of violence during raids. However, small raids were 
conducted often during 2009 to 2010, and daily during the 2010 to 2011 dry season, 
starting in November.52 The reduction in scale has been partly attributed to the response 
and presence of the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), as it established 
temporary operating bases in the Lou-Nuer and Murle territories of Akobo and Pibor 
County respectively. As will be explained in the parable of the tribe in Chapter 3, the 
presence of outside forces led to a cessation in hostilities. However, as these bases were 
temporary, once the UNMIS presence was removed, conflict re-occurred. 
In January and early February 2011 the Murle conducted a series of small-scale 
raids in Uror County. On February 6th, a Murle raid resulted in the death of eight Lou-
Nuer; three were traditional chiefs. Initial attempts were made to resolve the conflict 	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through dialogue and bloodwealth by County officials, the South Sudanese Police Force 
(SSPF), SPLA, and Pibor chiefs.53 All parties agreed that the raiders should be arrested 
and the cattle returned. Although there was widespread support to resolve the conflict, the 
GOSS failed to implement the agreement. The SPLA recovered only a portion of the 
cattle, 260 of the 1000, and failed to return the cattle to the Lou-Nuer. Furthermore, the 
SSPF failed to arrest the raiders responsible. 
The inability of various government authorities to respond to the killing of three 
traditional chiefs can be viewed as the last straw for the Lou-Nuer. Subsequent 
retaliations increased to an unprecedented scale of violence, with each counter-raid 
topping the level of violence of the previous raid. The peak of the cycle of conflict 
between the Lou-Nuer and Murle occurred from December 2011 until February 2012. 
Beginning on December 23rd, 2011, a new ‘white army’54 force of 8000 men composed 
from a Lou-Nuer majority and Dinka minority launched a series of attacks on the Murle. 
Conservative estimates suggest these attacks resulted in a total of 1000 Murle deaths - the 
highest level of casualties seen in Jonglei since the Bor Massacre.55  
The white army was the largest force assembled since the signing of the CPA. It 
was well organized, and able to carry out large-scale attacks. The subsequent retaliations 
by the Murle could not match the level of violence achieved by the white army. At most, 
the Murle were able to mobilize a few hundred fighters for any given raid. However, the 
Murle traditionally organized in small mobile groups, allowing them to strike quickly; 
this allowed the small groups to steal large amounts of cattle; e.g., during the 2012 raids 	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during the Second Sudanese Civil War, the new force does not have direct connections to the original white 
army. Furthermore, the new ‘white army’ consists of both Nuer and Dinka forces. 
55 Leff, “My Neighbour, My Enemy: Inter-tribal violence in Jonglei,” 3-5. 
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they stole 95,000 cattle. The number of cattle acquired during the raids was especially 
impressive given the relatively small number of raiders. The white army, with a much 
larger force, stole 100,000 cattle during the raids. Both tactics, although different, have 
been able to balance out the number of deaths and value of cattle stolen. While the white 
army conducted more singular large attacks, the quick Murle attacks resulted in high 
levels of destruction when added up. As seen in Table 1, after the December 2011 and 
January 2012 attacks by the Lou, the Murle conducted three subsequent raids. Given the 
mobility of the Murle, they were able to conduct several raids from December 2011 to 
March 2012 that resulted in the deaths of approximately 526 Lou-Nuer.  
2.5 Cyclical Conflict between the Dinka and Murle 
 There were comparatively few major clashes between the Dinka and Murle. The 
only major attack by the Dinka on the Murle occurred in Bor. Members of the Murle tribe 
rarely travel to Bor since they are often beaten or killed there. In 2007, seven Murle were 
killed - four while waiting to be treated at a Médicins Sans Frontières (MSF) hospital.56 
The relative absence of clashes between the Dinka and the Murle is partially due to the 
way in which the December 2011 clashes are reported. The new ‘white army’ is 
portrayed as a Lou-Nuer force, drawing upon imagery from the second civil war. 
However, this re-constituted white army had Dinka participants. While the Dinka did not 
comprise the majority of the force, their presence was significant. A combined force 
indicated an alliance of the Murle’s two rivals, putting the Murle in a weak position. 
Furthermore, the rhetoric used by the new white army, indicating that their operations 
would not end “…until the Murle do not pose a security threat to their neighbours,” only 
served to increase the scale of violence. The Murle began to respond to the white army 	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attacks “as if their survival depend[ed] on taking the fight to their Nuer and Dinka 
enemies.”57 As will be explained in Chapter 3, according to the parable of the tribe 
argument, the increased insecurity felt by the Murle led to the belief that the opposing 
force would not stop its attacks until the Murle were completely defeated. For this reason, 
the parable explains that the Murle had to respond in kind to defend themselves. 
2.6 Conclusion 
As described in this chapter, there has been a shift in the way cattle raids have 
been conducted. The cycles of conflict from 2009 until 2012 have clearly departed from 
small-scale raids focused on increasing the size of tribal herds. The conflict between the 
Dinka, Lou-Nuer, and Murle slowly escalated starting in 2009 because tribes that were 
attacked did not only want to respond with proportional levels of violence, but increased 
the levels in order to dissuade subsequent retaliations. Dissuasion did not result, and the 
violence of the clashes steadily increased, peaking in 2012. With the escalation of 
conflict, the rhetoric used by each of the tribes became increasingly hostile. This was 
particularly the case with rhetoric directed at the Murle, who began to act as if their 
survival depended on retaliation. As will be discussed in the next chapter, this approach 
causes cycles of violence that could continue until only one tribe is left. However, due to 
a decrease in the scale of violence in 2012, it is more likely that the violence will 
continue until there is outside intervention. While cattle raids in Jonglei still occur on a 
regular basis in 2013, levels of violence have decreased. This is partially due to the strong 
presence of the SPLA in Jonglei, as troops are deployed there to deal with the David Yau 
Yau rebel group. However, once this presence is removed, unless the conflict between the 
tribes is resolved, violence could once again escalate in Jonglei. 	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Chapter 3: The Tribe in Concepts and Theory 
3.1 Introduction  
The content of this thesis is situated in an evolving debate, in which many of the 
concepts that are used are being constantly re-evaluated. This chapter aims to throw light 
on this debate, particularly in regards to the use of the term tribe, given that it is 
considered controversial in the literature. I will define key concepts that are used 
throughout the thesis, including tribe, clan, and ethnicity, in order to explain why tribe is 
the best descriptor for the conflict in Jonglei State. By looking at these different 
descriptors, the importance of peripheral characteristics will demonstrate that tribe, clan, 
and ethnicity are not synonymous in the case of group conflicts. There will also be a brief 
discussion of the post-colonial state, as it has encouraged the persistence of tribal 
structures within Jonglei State. Finally, the chapter will end with the parable of the tribe, 
the key theory explaining cyclical tribal conflict. As seen in the previous chapter, cycles 
of conflict in Jonglei are likely to continue until outside intervention prevents conflict. 
However, it is unlikely that the GOSS will continue to deploy the SPLA in Jonglei once 
the David Yau Yau rebellion has been dealt with. Once this force is no longer present, 
conflict is likely to re-occur in the same cyclical form that it assumed from 2009-2012. 
However, as will be discussed in Chapter Four, the tradition of cattle raiding did not 
continue until only one tribe achieved an outright victory, as the parable of the tribes 
would lead one to believe. Although cyclical, there were mechanisms in place to ensure 
that the conflict ended after a few cycles. Given the use of bloodwealth as compensation 
and the structure of elder mediation, conflicts did not continue indefinitely. It is important 
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to situate this thesis within the larger debate in the literature, especially as I will take the 
side of the debate that uses the descriptor of tribe rather than ethnicity.  
3.2 Concept of Tribe 
3.2.1 Criticisms of ‘Tribe’ 
 This thesis is centered in a polarized debate within the group conflict literature 
concerning whether the term ethnicity or tribe can be applied to the group conflict 
situation in Jonglei.  Criticisms of the use of the term ‘tribe’ as a unit of analysis have led 
to an insider-outsider distinction, in which those who use the term tribe as a descriptor in 
academic work are found on the ‘outside,’ and required to justify their choice. This divide 
in the literature has led to ethnicity becoming the default ‘right’ descriptor, while using 
the term tribe is seen as the ‘wrong’ way of approaching group conflict.58 Marie Smith 
believes that when looking at conflicts in Africa, understanding both sides of the debate 
is important, because some of the underlying causes might be overlooked by naming a 
conflict ‘ethnic’ or ‘tribal’ without understanding what the terms represent. 59  By 
staunchly taking one side, without consideration of the criticisms the other side brings to 
the analysis, both sides miss the potential for a complete analysis. 
The core argument against the use of tribe is that the term embodies a negative 
stereotype. Ronald Atkinson argues that the term tribal is the product of a particular time, 
when the language used to study ethnicity was based in a tribal discourse. The term tribal 
was used because it was the prevailing way of characterizing ethnic groups in Africa - in 
both academia and the mainstream literature - until the 1970s, when the more 
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‘appropriate’ descriptor of ethnicity was made popular.60 Furthermore, Soyinka-Airewele 
argues that those who still use tribal as an explanatory term are doing so to bring up 
associations that the members of the tribe are “primitive, racially or genetically 
predisposed to fight, and incapable of or unwilling to resolve conflicts themselves.”61 
This belief returns us to the insider-outsider distinction and creates a polarization in the 
field by categorizing all academics who use the term tribal as promoting the use of 
negative stereotypes. However, the core argument that using the term tribal can possibly 
reinforce underlying stereotypes must be taken into account. 
Returning to Atkinson’s analysis, he outlines three stereotypes that caused 
academics to move away from using tribal as a descriptor. First, by using the term tribe, 
academics divided people into two binary categories: tribal or not tribal.62 Second, 
defining the particular tribes to which individuals belong is complicated since a specific 
criterion for tribe has been difficult to identify. Finally, Atkinson argues that talk of tribal 
identities implies that they are “ancient and powerful,” and that tribes are unchanging.63  
Critics of the term argue that those considered to be members of tribes would only 
associate with other member of their small group, implying a form of primitive political 
development. However, current political systems in many African countries are based on 
the ability to harness the allegiance of particular groups, including tribes. The current 
political system in South Sudan encourages continued tribal distinctions within particular 
states, as seen in the strong connection of the Dinka tribe to government and the military 	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positions. Defining a tribe is more difficult; although recognized as political units, other 
factors such as territory, language, and race have also been used as elements of the 
definition of a tribe as well as ethnicity. 64  However, there are key peripheral 
characteristics that help define the concept of a tribe. Atkinson’s criticism of the tribal 
stereotype as implying ‘ancient and powerful’ identities has been disregarded by many 
academics, and in the popular literature, since it is understood that groups – such as tribes 
– are fluid and therefore always adapting. There are many examples of individuals and 
even groups that have changed or been absorbed by another group; this helps counters the 
fear that stressing distinct tribal identities would lead the reader to assume that tribal 
cultures are formed in isolation from other groups and society.65  
Frederick Barth argues that the persistence of ‘boundaries’ between different 
groups, even given considerable mobility, demonstrates the importance of understanding 
that there is a “process of exclusion and incorporation whereby discrete categories are 
maintained.”66 The maintenance of these categories allows academics to study different 
tribes and the conflicts that are derived from their interaction. There is a loss of 
understanding and context when the term tribe is replaced by ethnicity, because the 
peripheral meaning of tribe is excluded from analysis. 
3.2.2 Defining Tribe  
Since the 1970s, the growing popularity of using ethnicity to describe certain 
group conflicts has led scholars to shy away from using the term tribal.67 Alexander 
Johnston draws attention to the phenomenon whereby commentators have tended to use 	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the term tribalism when they disapprove of certain actions, while ethnicity is used as a 
‘less judgmental’ descriptor for conflicts or events.68 There is a tendency for ethnicity to 
be used in the literature for situations where the political system resembles a ‘modern’ 
western democracy, in which rational individuals are working towards the creation of 
their own state or some form of self-determination. On the other hand, tribalism has been 
used in the context of actions that are viewed as irrational, backwards, and non-conducive 
to state building. This descriptor of tribal compared to ethnic conflict does not withstand 
testing, as many ethno-national conflicts have been detrimental to state building and have 
involved irrational slaughter.69  
Chris Gillian discusses the problems that arise when academics attempt to be 
more ‘enlightened’ in the terms they use in hopes of avoiding possible political and moral 
problems that can be associated with controversial terms.70 These political and moral 
associations, however, are critical to the understanding of any conflict. Even though 
tribalism has been used as a pejorative term, if it is used in its proper context and 
explained, scholars should not shy away from using the term. Through a more detailed 
examination of particular conflicts, and by using the term tribalism in appropriate 
contexts, the term can be re-claimed and used more effectively.  
 In the conflict literature, many descriptors have been used interchangeably in 
discussions of group conflicts. Race, nation, ethnicity, tribe, and clan have all been used 
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as synonyms in academia as well as the popular media.71 The use of these concepts in the 
popular media, however, has led to a “slippage in usage”, since sources such as 
newspapers do not require academic precision in the terms that they employ.72 Even so, 
how can all these terms be used interchangeably to describe a large variety of conflicts 
that have very different causes and results? Steve Fenton discusses the phenomenon of 
the presence of core and periphery traits in terms used to describe similar, but different, 
events. He believes this occurs since such terms tend to share core characteristics which 
allow them to be used interchangeably in certain cases to discuss various groups.73 This 
becomes problematic; at times a national group, a racial group, an ethnic group, a tribe, 
and a clan become synonymous in the conflict literature. This occurs because in some 
circumstances, those who are writing or reading about the terms emphasize the core traits 
that the terms all share. Implied in the literature on group conflicts is that the groups 
under consideration share common characteristics such as history, descent, language, 
religion and culture.74 However, these terms also differ in many ways, which is why 
Fenton emphasizes the importance of peripheral traits.  
Although a group conflict could be described using any of the above terms, to 
understand the intricacies of the conflict the way in which the conflict is described is 
critical. If a conflict is described using the wrong term, the core traits will be present, but 
peripheral traits will be excluded from the discussion. The use in this thesis of the terms 
ethnic group, tribe, and clan must be explained because all three terms have been used as 
synonyms, as they share similar core characteristics. While the core characteristics of 
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common history, descent, tradition, and culture are shared by the groups identified by 
these three terms, they are differentiated from other group descriptors due to the internal 
structures described. Each of these terms describes a group wherein the members not only 
identify themselves as part of the group, but are “identified by others, as constituting a 
category distinguishable from other categories in the same order.”75 In other words, 
individuals can identify themselves as part of a particular tribe; other members of that 
tribe affirm their belonging, and the tribe, through its own history, descent, traditions, and 
cultures, differentiates itself from another tribal group. The same is true of both ethnic 
groups and clans. Due to some basic similarities, these terms are used interchangeably 
when the core characteristics are emphasized when	  describing a particular situation.  
However, the peripheral characteristics of these terms, although limited, are quite 
distinct (see figure 4). The peripheral characteristics of clans are kinship networks with 
an emphasis on lineage.76 The emphasis on lineage is the defining peripheral distinction 
in comparison with the other terms because clans are understood as being “a group of 
people linked by putative unilateral descent.”77 While there are occasions where common 
ancestry is perceived rather than factual, the clan must recognize that members share a 
common lineage. In many cases, clans play a significant political role even within larger 
groups.78 In the case of the Murle in Jonglei, the ‘red chiefs’, who are the hereditary 
rulers in Murle tribes, consist of the Bulanec clan.79 	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Figure 4: Core and Peripheral Characteristics 
 
A tribe has the peripheral characteristics of location and size. Location does not 
mean looking at a conflict in Africa in comparison to Europe, but rather that the 
particular location of a tribe (or multiple locations for nomadic tribes) is crucial when 
looking at tribal interactions. In Jonglei State in South Sudan, the interactions between 
bordering tribes of the Dinka, Lou Nuer and Murle have been centered within the area in 
which these groups have been living for much of their histories (see figure 5). Their 
location and proximity to each other has defined their relationship. Furthermore, the size 
of a tribe is an important distinction. Although there are tribes that can become quite 
large and spread out among different cities and regions, an individual’s primary 
affiliation is to the local tribal group. This is seen in the case of the Lou-Nuer in Jonglei 
State. The Lou-Nuer are members of a confederation of Nuer tribes that extends across 
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East Africa; however, an individual’s loyalty lies with the local tribe. This is exemplified 
in the conflict that occurred between the Lou-Nuer and the Janaki-Nuer in 2009. While 
both tribes have a similar ancestry, conflict erupted and the loyalties each individual was 
given to the local tribe. Since ethnicity evolved into a blanket term for various groups, it 
does not have a defining peripheral characteristic. Saideman and Jenne define ethnic 
groups “according to markers that are perceived to be inherited, such as race, religion, or 
language.”80 For this reason, more specific terms such as clan or tribe should often be 
used rather than the all-encompassing term of ethnicity. 
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Figure 5: Map of Tribes in Jonglei State. International Crisis Group, “Jonglei’s Tribal Conflicts: 
Countering Insecurity in South Sudan,” Africa Report no. 154 (23 December 2009): Appendix B. 
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3.3 The Existence of Tribes in the Modern State 
Johnston has suggested that three issues must be addressed to resolve some of the 
problematic aspects of using tribal in the context of African conflicts.81 First, academics 
must ensure that they do not generalize about tribal conflicts in Africa as a whole. In this 
sense, tribal conflicts have different effects depending on the individual country, and the 
socio-historical context of individual situations must be understood. 82  Second, the 
historical context of the conflicts being analyzed must be addressed. This emphasizes the 
importance of looking at “the continuity and weight of indigenous historical experience 
in understanding contemporary Africa.”83 Many Africanists have discussed the need to 
look at the pre-colonial settings of conflicts in addition to problems caused by 
colonization, decolonization, and post-colonization. 84  Finally, as discussed above, 
Johnson emphasizes that the discourse of tribalism must always be acknowledged.  
Academics who look at the state of African politics have argued that Africa 
currently exists in a postcolonial political space, and this ‘new’ space must be understood 
to properly examine current problems in Africa. In certain countries, such as South 
Sudan, tribes are one of the sub-national groups that are part of the political structure. 
Johnson emphasizes that tribes have no desire to create their own states or obstruct the 
current state, but that their presence causes the development of state authority and power 
structures around the existing divisions.85 Whether the state is a multi-party democracy, 
autocracy, or under military rule, political leaders will seek to use these existing divisions 
to maintain power. The postcolonial politics that draw from existing power bases, 	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according to African scholar Achille Mbembe, is not a ‘new’ phenomenon, but rather an 
adaptation of colonial and pre-colonial systems that has been altered to suit the needs of 
African leaders. Therefore, when looking at the current political system in South Sudan, 
the local structures are affected by, and affect, those who hold political power. The state 
systems in Africa have therefore been engineered in order to satisfy the requirements of 
the elites that rule over a young and growing population.  
The former colonial Turko-Egyptian administration established the system of 
governance in Sudan, remnants of which are still visible today. During the period after 
Muhammad Ali’s invasion, the Sudan was ruled under the Ottoman system, which 
superimposed the authority of a Governor-General and army leaders upon the country.86 
The Governor-General had exclusive control over civil and military power within the 
Sudan. This extensive power could have led to strong governance and consistent policies. 
However, from 1821 until 1877, twenty Governor-Generals administered Sudan during a 
period of just over fifty-five years.87 This led to inconsistent governance of Sudan as a 
whole, encouraging regional governance. The Sudan was further divided into 
administrative provinces, which were under the control of provincial military 
commanders.88 Finally, within the provinces, the traditional jurisdiction of the local 
population over tribal territories was maintained within the administrative structure.89 
This structure did not change to any significant degree after its inception in 1821 until the 
independence of Sudan in 1956. 	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In the postcolonial state, the political elites have developed close relationships 
with the population that they rule, creating a system of “deeply personalized political 
relations.”90 Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz believe that this system of personal 
politics can be understood in terms of a patrimonial relationship that is derived from the 
support by segments of the population to the established system. While the various 
segments might not support the system wholeheartedly, they recognize that those who 
support the system, in turn, receive benefits from the state. In South Sudan, political elites 
tend to be from the Dinka tribal groups (the largest tribe in South Sudan), which has led 
to the perception by other tribes that the Dinka will be given preferential treatment in the 
distribution of benefits and services from the government. Mbembe believes that the 
reason this connection is accepted is because of its roots in tradition, whereby the local 
population conceives its place within the society in relation to the system of rewards and 
punishment received from the state.91 Unlike the Dinka, the Murle tribal groups in South 
Sudan traditionally have been excluded from government attention and benefits, and yet 
the Murle do not rebel against the government. This is due to an understanding that such 
action would lead to a heavy-handed response by the Southern Sudanese military. 
Therefore, the relationship between the population and the government is not solely 
based on the provision of benefits, but equally on an understanding that acting against the 
state could lead to violent responses or exclusion from the distribution of benefits.  
While personal politics is used in South Sudan on a day-to-day basis, the 
institutions described in the constitution are designed to allow all citizens participate in 
the state institutions. Mbembe believes that this is because the realities of African politics 	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differ greatly from the ‘system’ of institutionalised politics that can be found in a 
country’s constitution. In particular, the ‘real’ systems of governance have always 
depended on indigenous social groups, giving rise to the ‘rootedness’ of African 
politics.92 Mbembe suggests that the system has not changed significantly due to the 
entrenched nature of the local relationship with political leaders. Mbembe’s observations 
about postcolonial governance are therefore critical of academics who focus on observing 
African politics solely within the framework of the state. He argues that in order to 
explain the political realities within Africa we must look at “the actual forms of power, its 
manifestations, and the various techniques that it uses to enhance its value, distribute the 
products of labor, and either ensure abundance or manage poverty and scarcity.”93  The 
power that allows the state to accomplish its tasks is given legitimacy by long-established 
relations of subjection which were established before colonization, and the way in which 
wealth was then distributed. This system is essentially a fusion of ‘customary traditions’ 
as well as ‘modern’ governance that evolved into postcolonial systems of governance. 
The current political systems in place in African states are due to the intertwining of 
violence, tradition, and benefits to which the population has become accustomed. Since 
this system allows tribal groups to persist and these groups are based on a particular 
location, the proximity of tribes can lead to conflict, although it is by no means 
inevitable. 
3.4 The Parable of the Tribe 
While the structure of the political system within a country must be observed in 
order to understand the reasons for the persistence of tribal politics in Africa, Mbembe 	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demonstrates that local factors must also be taken into account. In many cases, tribal 
groups co-exist peacefully. When a tribe – like many other groups – is not threatened, 
social barriers are de-emphasized, allowing for fluidity and exchange between groups. 
This can increase interaction between tribes and even lead to movement between them 
through marriage. However, when there is an external threat, groups begin to doubt each 
other and trust is lost. In the 1960s, Max Gluckman argued that at times of conflict – 
often caused in some way by the structure of power within the state – sub-groups within 
the state tend to emphasize the importance of rituals.94 This sentiment has been echoed by 
many academics who study group politics.  
Fredrik Barth, who examined the boundaries that are established between 
different groups, emphasized that the distinct cultural features of groups help maintain 
the boundaries between them.95 The group can only continue to exist if the culture 
remains differentiable from that of other groups in the area. In the presence of potential 
violence, individuals return to tribes for protection and security from outside sources. In 
situations where violence is a constant threat, it becomes “a powerful force for the ‘re-
traditionalization’ of society.”96 In order to ensure cohesion within the group, the tribe’s 
characteristics are emphasized, creating a rallying point from external threats. The 
importance of culture and its use as a feature to distinguish between different tribes 
becomes increasingly important at times of conflict. As in the case of other group 
conflicts, when different tribal groups are threatened they begin to solidify those aspects 
that make them distinct. This leads to ‘othering’ all tribes that are in close proximity, 
even if previous relations were peaceful, as they can pose a potential threat.  	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The parable of the tribe explores the importance of the defense of culture through 
a scenario that can be adapted to many different cyclical tribal conflicts, such as those in 
Jonglei State in South Sudan. It postulates that in a specific region, tribes tend to live in 
fairly close proximity to each other. While these tribes can co-exist peacefully and 
interact with each other, it only takes one of the tribes in the region to act aggressively to 
start a chain of conflict.97 Once a tribe acts aggressively, other tribes within its proximity 
are forced to take action since they could potentially be the victims of an attack. If a tribe 
refuses to fight the aggressor, then according to the parable of the tribe, it has four other 
options: “(1) withdraw from the region, (2) allow itself to be destroyed, (3) surrender to 
the aggressor and become a tributary vassal tribe, or (4) be absorbed culturally and 
politically into the aggressor tribe.”98 In the parable, the only way a tribe can remain in its 
original state is if it fights the aggressor tribe and wins.  
The parable of the tribe demonstrates not only that tribal conflict erupts because 
of the close proximity of groups, but also because the alternatives to fighting are 
incompatible with the core and peripheral characteristics present in ‘tribes’. The first 
option would result in a loss of tribal territory and being forced to move to a new 
location. This would not be a favorable option due to the importance of territory to tribal 
identity. The second option, the destruction of a tribe, occurs when the tribe refuses to 
withdraw from the territory it inhabits and refuses to fight for its territory.99 The third 
option allows a tribe to stay intact and remain in its geographic location, but being forced 
into a subservient relationship with another tribe would be demeaning. In the final option 	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of absorption, the tribe as a group is lost and the most crucial characteristic – the tribe’s 
identity – is eliminated. Since tribal identity and culture is the most important core 
characteristic, fleeing is preferable because it would only involve the loss of the 
peripheral characteristic of territory. If both the core and peripheral characteristics cannot 
be protected, then core characteristics take priority. However, if a tribe wishes to remain 
culturally and territorially intact, then it has no choice but to fight the threats. If the tribes 
in the region choose to fight, the conflict will continue until there is only one tribe left. In 
this scenario, attacks and counterattacks would lead to a cyclical conflict, due to the low 
likelihood of the outright victory of one tribe over the others. 
While the parable of the tribe provides some insights into the reasons for cyclical 
tribal conflict, it is incomplete as an analytical tool because it only accounts for five 
options. The parable assumes that there is no potential for cooperation after conflict 
begins. However, most conflicts do not end in total victory when groups choose to fight, 
but lead to negotiations and compromise. As will be discussed in the next chapter, the 
history of cattle raiding in Jonglei demonstrates that there is an established tradition of 
mediation when conflict occurs. However, the current breakout of tribal conflict in 
Jonglei closely resembles the cyclical pattern described in the parable of the tribes, since 
there has been a steady string of attacks and counterattacks since 2009.100  
Thus far, breaks between the attacks have been caused by outside actors involving 
themselves in Jonglei. The parable of the tribe, based in realist and neorealist discourse, 
assumes that no outside actor can or is willing to interfere in the conflict.101 However, 
intervention from international, government, and non-governmental actors often occurs 	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when a group conflict breaks out. In Jonglei, once outside groups have left the state or 
particular region, fighting re-occurs until another outside intervention. Since 2012, the 
cycle of conflict has stalled due to the presence of SPLA forces in Jonglei. While the 
SPLA’s primary focus is ending the rebellion by David Yau Yau, its proximity has 
caused a reduction in the number of clashes. 
3.5 Conclusion 
The current conflict in Jonglei State is a clear example of a tribal conflict, not 
only in its definition, but the way in which it is carried out. The Dinka, Lou-Nuer, and 
Murle have valued not only the core characteristics of culture, tradition, and identity, but 
also the peripheral characteristics of location. In order to distinguish itself, each tribe has 
emphasized its territorial location, attacking and defending its territory from other groups. 
While location is a peripheral trait, by emphasizing its importance, the tribes in Jonglei 
have ruled out every other alternative in the parable of the tribe other than to fight and 
win. 
With the concepts defined, the next section will analyze the tradition of cattle 
raiding historically. As was discussed in the introduction to the thesis, the interactions 
between tribes in Jonglei changed during the Second Sudanese Civil War, leading to a 
lack of trust and cyclical violence. If this trust cannot be re-established, then the cyclical 
nature of the conflict described in the parable of the tribes will occur until there is either 
an outright victory or outside intervention. An interesting point is that the conflict in 
Jonglei re-occurs once outside actors withdraw from the area or when the forces that are 
in the area are no longer considered a threat. This implies that the initiative for ending the 
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conflict must occur at the local level. Such local level cooperation existed between the 
Dinka, Lou-Nuer, and Murle previously - a relationship that the next chapter will explore. 
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Chapter 4: A Socio-Cultural Analysis of Cattle Raiding in Jonglei State 
4.1 Introduction 
To explain the changes that have occurred in the practice of cattle raiding between 
the Dinka, Lou-Nuer, and Murle in Jonglei state in South Sudan, this chapter will provide 
a socio-cultural anthropological analysis of the significance of the tradition of cattle 
raiding for each of the tribes. Emphasis will be placed on the beliefs, laws, and customs 
of each tribe concerning cattle raiding, while the roles of different age groups within the 
tribal structure will demonstrate the distinct status and responsibility that each group 
possessed. Although the literature on post-conflict reconstruction emphasizes the 
implementation of local traditions and solutions, not enough interdisciplinary work with 
socio-cultural anthropology has been conducted to understand traditional conflict and 
peace-making traditions.102 By using a cross-disciplinary analysis, I will identify the 
difference between the past and current structures of raids to better determine a course of 
action that could be taken by the tribes in Jonglei to address cattle raiding violence. The 
reasons why, in the past, raids between tribes occurred but did not result in large scale 
violence, will be explained through a focus on the importance of cattle to the tribes, the 
practice as a rite of passage, and the role of elders in the raids. The persistence of cattle 
raiding indicates that the motives for the raids are still strong. Historically, however, the 
way in which the raids were conducted reduced the likelihood of conflict. Furthermore, if 
conflict did erupt, tribal elders would step in and mediate the process. Elder influence 
occurred through an emphasis on traditional codes of conduct, facilitating the raids, and 
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mediating conflict if it occurred. Historically, tribal elders were able to ensure that youth 
were able to participate in this crucial rite of passage without it leading to tribal warfare. 
4.2 Importance of Cattle 
Historically, cattle were the currency of Jonglei State. Even today, cattle represent 
a consistent currency with a known and reliable value among the different communities. 
In Dinka, Lou-Nuer, and Murle societies, an individual demonstrates wealth by 
possessing many cattle, while a lack of cattle demonstrates poverty.103 Due to the cattle 
economy that exists in Jonglei state, cattle effectively are a replacement for money. Even 
if an individual has a fair amount of money, without cattle he is considered to be poor. 
This proved problematic as young men began to leave villages to find work, and returned 
with state currency. Although money could be converted to cattle, purchased cattle are 
not considered to be worth the same as cattle that are acquired through inheritance, 
bridewealth, bloodwealth, gifts, or raids. These cattle represent more than wealth; they 
are indicators of the links between different individuals.104  
As late as the 1930s, no member of the Nuer tribe would give up cattle for money, 
as it would be the equivalent of giving up the ties that were created when the cattle were 
acquired.105 Cattle that are bought have not been taken care of by the individual receiving 
them, which means that that individual is not acquiring its full wealth. Cattle can provide 
milk and calves, which are in themselves valuable. Cattle that are received through 
inheritance, bridewealth, bloodwealth, or gifts have provided this wealth to the previous 
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owner, which creates a bond through the cattle. This is reflected in Dinka culture, 
whereby the cattle that are acquired through descent (or these cattle’s offspring) are 
highly valued and protected as this continues the bond with the owner’s ancestors.106  
Cattle represent value not only in monetary terms, but also in a personal form. 
The Nuer believed that cattle represented an extension of an individual’s persona.107 
Therefore, if cattle are given away, a part of the owner which is connected to those cattle 
is also given away. Cattle could be given to create a friendship or alliances between 
different tribes or even within the tribe, and cattle are also given as bridewealth to the 
family of a girl in order for her family to approve the marriage. They could also be given 
to an individual or group as bloodwealth to end a feud and gain peace between the 
parties. Therefore, with an abundance of cattle, an individual can provide for his family 
through trade, bridewealth and bloodwealth. Furthermore, as there was (and arguably still 
is) no market in which cattle could be sold for cash, the continued existence of a cattle 
economy in Jonglei is encouraged. 
In Murle society, cattle shaped the lives of tribe members, since they “live off 
their cattle, but they also live with them.”108 The Dinka, Lou-Nuer and Murle’s lifestyle 
was dictated by cattle. This led to semi-nomadic lives for the Murle and Nuer, usually 
between two traditional residences. The Dinka residences were more established; as a 
result, youths had to herd the cattle to separate camps in the dry season. In each tradition, 
there is a belief that if the cattle are taken care of, then the cattle will provide for all the 
needs of an individual. The Dinka believe that cattle provide all worldly needs to them. 
This is exemplified in the belief that if the Dinka dedicate their life to cattle, and only 	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sacrifice them on special occasions, the cattle will “protect the Dinka against the forces of 
illness and death.”109 In each of the tribes, cattle are not killed on a regular basis for food. 
Only on occasions when a special guest must be honored or for a special feast are cattle 
killed for food.110 In each of the tribes, cattle played a crucial role in intra-communal 
relationships.  
For the Nuer, cattle were exchanged in order to create enduring bonds between 
individuals.111 Similar traditions were practiced by the Murle and Dinka. Bridewealth is a 
tradition practiced in each tribe, and involves the gift of cattle to a women’s father for 
marriage.  However, one of the more relevant uses of cattle, in terms of ending cycles of 
conflict, arises from the tradition of bloodwealth. Within each tribal tradition, it was 
customary to re-pay the family of an individual killed in conflict – or raids – with 
cattle.112 The hope was that the compensation would obviate the need to retaliate and 
feuds between tribes could be avoided. On occasions grudges are held and revenge raids 
are carried out to allow for the opportunity to inflict similar damage on the group that 
committed the original crime. It is acceptable in the Dinka culture to provoke violence in 
order to avenge a relative. This results in a cycle of raids, particularly when the raids 
occur between different tribes. However, bloodwealth is considered effective in at least 
eliminating immediate raids. The Dinka, Lou-Nuer, and Murle each use cattle to resolve 
all forms of conflict. While bridewealth is still a crucial part of tribal life in Jonglei at 
present, individuals who inflict harm during raids have not continued the tradition of 
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bloodwealth. This is partly due to the lack of accountability in current raids - but without 
bloodwealth compensation, the likelihood of retaliation is much higher. 
4.3 Traditional Approaches to War and Peace 
The literature on post-conflict reconstruction has begun to identify key areas 
within social anthropology that must be researched in order to understand local 
approaches to war and peacemaking. These approaches fall into four broad categories: 
the rituals involved in warfare and during peacemaking; the structures and systems of 
government involved in war and peace; the methods by which groups communicate 
across cultures and what norms govern these exchanges; and the forms of compensation 
used as part of the peacemaking process.113  A conflict arising from cattle raids, and the 
peace that is negotiated afterwards, can be discussed in terms of these four categories. As 
previously described, compensation in the Dinka, Lou-Nuer, and Murle tribes 
traditionally took the form of bloodwealth, and any conflict that occurred was resolved 
through an exchange of cattle. The other categories will be covered in the following 
sections. 
4.4 Youth Initiation 
The connection between youth and cattle is one of the primary reasons for 
conflicts attributed to raiding. Youth are given the responsibility for caring for the cattle 
and guarding them. Within Dinka tribes, this forces youth to leave, during the dry season, 
for separate cattle camps away from their community so that cattle can have access to 
water and grazing lands. In each of the three tribes, youth are ‘initiated’ as groups. This 
group initiation is an important aspect of the warrior culture that existed due to constant 
threats from other tribes. Known as age-sets, groups of young men would move through 	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traditional ‘life milestones’ as they aged. At each progressive level, they would be given 
more responsibility for the affairs of the community.  
The initiation for the Dinka begins with a ceremonial operation in which 7-10 
deep cuts are made across the forehead of each member of the age-set.114 This process 
allows a boy to become a man, and be given responsibilities within the community. A 
symbol of the responsibility that the young man will have to shoulder is demonstrated in 
his receipt of spears. While in their communities, the young men help with agricultural 
work and various construction projects. However, Dinka youth spend much of their time 
herding cattle. Not only does this involve youth leaving for cattle camps to find pastures, 
but this also allows youth to be out of the control of tribal elders.115 Although the youth 
fulfill their duties in caring for the cattle, the distance from their tribe gives the youth the 
freedom to act on impulse, which can include raiding cattle. Not only is this due to lack 
of supervision, but the nomadic nature of the cattle camps often brings Dinka youth close 
to other groups. 
In Murle tribes, different age-sets determine both the position of an individual 
within the tribe, as well as the specific duties that individuals are expected to perform in 
their daily lives. Groups of young men proceed from youths to warriors through an 
initiation process, and then as they age they gradually proceed to junior-elder and then 
elder status.116 This form of organization was designed to gear the entire Murle tribe to a 
structure that was based on defense or attack. The progress from youth to warriorhood is 
particularly important, as “warriors form a standing guard for the protection of the 
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country, and have the duty of herding cattle.” 117  The initiation process, although 
abandoned under Anglo-Egyptian rule, required an initiated warrior to kill a man in ‘war’ 
against a neighboring tribe. This led to campaigns being carried out at the end of the 
rainy season on a regular basis, causing regular conflict between tribes. The tribal elders 
would make the decisions about the campaign’s target as well as how it would be carried 
out.118 Although this specific initiation requirement to kill another man is no longer 
practiced, the structure of and relation between the different age-sets has persisted. 
The Nuer age-set system is slightly different from the systems of the Dinka and 
Murle as there are only two different groupings: boyhood and manhood.119 Groups are 
initiated from boyhood to manhood by making 6 cuts across the forehead.120 However, 
within these groupings there are junior and senior sets, resulting in a separation of 
responsibilities within the two groupings. One position in the Murle tribe that 
accompanied the initiation process was the nya-kagen or ‘captain’ of a particular age-
set.121 This individual was the leader of his age-set and ensured that the group followed 
the instructions of tribal elders by disciplining those that did not. This position was 
initially thought to no longer be useful once the initiation process ended and warfare 
between groups was reduced under the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium. However, these 
captains were very effective in ensuring order within their age groups, and without them 
it became more difficult to get the warriors to participate in ‘unpopular tasks’ such as 
road building.122 This position could be reintroduced to facilitate communication between 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 Ibid., 84. 
118 Ibid., 87. 
119 Evans-Pritchard, The Nuer, 7. 
120 Ibid., 249. 
121 Lewis, The Murle, 87. 
122 Ibid., 87. 
	  	   54	  
the youth and elders within the different tribes. Although unique to the Murle, the captain 
represents an important youth leadership position that could also play a positive role if 
introduced into the Dinka and Nuer tribes. 
4.5 Structure of the Rule of Law Within Tribes 
The structures to resolve the external conflicts of cattle raids are based on 
traditions of conflict resolution at the local tribal level. There are similarities within the 
Dinka, Lou-Nuer and Murle traditions which directly influence to the way in which these 
tribal groups interact with each other. One of these commonalities is that within tribes 
conflicts are resolved with cattle, since “they have to be paid in compensation or 
atonement.”123 The involvement of tribal elders is another important commonality within 
each individual tribal system. Although the tradition described bellow is found within the 
Murle structure of law, the way in which the community, elders, and cattle are used in the 
process are very similar to the structure found in the Dinka and Lou-Nuer systems. The 
only strong difference in the process is the role of the chief, in that the Dinka and Nuer do 
not ‘curse’ the guilty if they do not respect the sentencing. 
Traditional Murle law is similar to case law. Each case is influenced by the 
precedents set by similar cases that are orally transmitted from each generation to the 
next.124 In particular, the Gayoi or spokesman is an individual who knows the tribal laws 
and has the ability to effectively convey a knowledge – often in a theatrical fashion – of 
the “details of the law… thus preserving tribal traditions and providing a check on the 
abuse of power by the chiefs.”125 This was often a hereditary position, as the relevant oral 
history would be passed down from father to son. Within the Murle tribe, the elders 	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traditionally settled disputes, while the drumchief would only decide on “important 
cases.”126 The drumchief was a member of the Bulanec clan; he was the hereditary chief 
of the Murle tribe whose right to rule was symbolically represented by his possession of 
the sacred drum.127 There was no specific set of cases that the drumchief would be 
required to hear because there was no division between civil and criminal law. However, 
the cases that were heard by the drumchief tended to involve conflicts over inheritance.128 
The importance of inheritance is drawn directly from the importance placed on cattle 
ownership.  
 The drumchief was included in important cases because he had the ability to 
curse an individual who did not abide by the ruling on a particular case.129 Although the 
emphasis on cursing an individual has diminished, the importance of the practice was that 
it led to shaming the guilty person, excluding them from the community, and often 
causing the individual to leave for exile. However, even in cases when the drumchief 
would rule on disputes, the council of elders effectively decided the cases.130 Once an 
individual was found guilty, the elders (including the chief if he was presiding over a 
case) then decided on a sentence. In the majority of the sentences, cattle were the form of 
payment between parties. The payment differed in terms of the specific types of cattle 
that were paid. Depending on the crime, the payment could be made in bulls, cows, 
heifers, and oxen in differing numbers and combinations. If the guilty individual could 
not produce the number of cattle agreed upon in a settlement, either they would have to 
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pay the cattle once a daughter was married, or another family member would have to 
supply the cattle.131 
 The Murle system of law was very effective since it had a long history of being 
perceived by the population as just. Most of the cases that were heard were public trials, 
which encouraged a fair decision-making process. In cases where the drumchief would 
decide on the settlement, the process took approximately three days, allowing for a 
sufficient amount of time for the case to be properly presented. However, for cases of a 
more minor nature, the elders would hold a private meeting at the village club (the social 
gathering place of a village characterized by a large tree and dancing area) and resolve 
the dispute quickly.132 Elders did not have the same duties that other tribe members had, 
and therefore spent most of their days at the club “talking, arguing, settling disputes, and 
smoking.”133 Elders took pride in ensuring the continued reputation of just rulings. 
Furthermore, the respect given by the community to the elders ensured that imposed 
settlements were carried out. 
4.6 Cattle Raids 
 The reason why raiding has played an important part in the cultural lives of the 
Dinka, Lou-Nuer and Murle is because raids allowed individuals, particularly young men, 
to acquire cattle and prestige. The Nuer celebrate a successful raid on neighboring tribes, 
and respect is accorded to the individual who stole the cattle.134 Although culturally 
accepted, raiding was (and is) ‘illegal’, and the perpetrator would be punished if caught in 
the act. In Murle society, if a man is caught stealing the property of another, it is 
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considered justifiable homicide if the thief is killed.135 Historically, deaths of this kind 
would have been the result of being beaten (with a stick or by hand as spears or steel 
weapons cannot be used). However, the circumstance that allows killing a thief to be 
justified is based on the potential need for the owner to defend himself against the 
thief.136 Since cattle raiding was conducted mostly at night, it was difficult for the 
defenders (if they knew a raid was occurring) to distinguish whether a member of the 
same tribal group, or an individual from a rival tribe, was conducting the raid. For this 
reason, raids did not result in many deaths.  
 In raids, only the attacker knew what group he was targeting. Therefore, if the 
attacker became violent, then it was more likely that he was from a different tribal group 
than the person he was stealing from. By the same token, if the raider did not use 
violence in the raid, he would most likely not be killed if caught stealing. The inability to 
identify who was raiding the cattle was crucial in the reaction the victims of the theft. The 
Lou-Nuer were not allowed to break a code of ethics, concerning fellow Nuer, that 
included killing.137 If this code were broken, then a blood curse would fall upon the 
offending individual until bloodwealth was paid. If the Nuer raided the Dinka and Murle 
and stole cattle or even killed, the Nuer would not suffer a blood curse. For this reason, 
raids were more likely to be carried out on another tribal group. 
Cattle raids by the Murle initially complemented the larger organized campaigns 
used in initiation. As the initiation process was abandoned, raids became one of the few 
ways in which young men could prove their bravery. In some cases, raids were carried 
out in small parties of 10-20 men, at night, which would allow for many cattle to be taken 	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at once.138 These raids had two key aims: to steal cattle and to conduct the raid covertly. 
Individuals who were able to steal many cattle without being caught were considered to 
be expert night fighters.139 However, the most frequent raids were conducted by ‘best 
friends’ on Nuer and Dinka cattle camps at night. The system of best friends in the Murle 
tradition was based on the age-set system. Each young male would have a best friend 
within his age-set and they would help each other throughout their initiation and life. The 
best friend system was based on the emphasis placed on fighting an enemy. During a 
conflict, best friends would fight alongside each other. If one died, the other would seek 
retribution.140 
The importance of conducting a raid covertly is not a feature of current cattle 
raids. Present raids have focused solely on stealing large numbers of cattle from a rival 
tribal group. Large groups now conduct raids in order to ensure that more cattle will be 
taken. The increased number of raiders also provides a greater assurance of protection if 
attacked. However, the larger the group raiding, the more likely it will be violently 
confronted because a larger group of attackers will be perceived as a major threat to the 
tribe being raided. Therefore, if raids conducted covertly and in small groups could be 
reintroduced, the likelihood of violent confrontations might decrease.  
4.7 Resolution of Conflict 
 In an ideal raid, young men will sneak onto a rival tribe’s territory, steal cattle, 
and return to their village without being caught. However, in certain cases, youth are 
caught in the act of cattle raiding, often resulting in a conflict. If either the raider or the 
target of the theft is killed in the confrontation over cattle, this is considered a 	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provocation by the tribe of the deceased. This leads to a larger tribal conflict in which all 
generations of warriors (excluding chiefs and elders) take up arms and attack the 
opposing tribe.141 Due to tribal cultural traditions, conflict between the two groups is 
expected to occur, and in some cases elders even participate in planning the retaliation.  
However, once retaliation has been carried out, the “role of chiefs and elders as 
peacemakers is then invoked to negotiate or mediate reconciliation.”142 Both the Dinka 
and the Murle have a tradition of chiefs as the leaders of tribes. For the Lou-Nuer, the 
position of chief was adopted during the period of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium.143 
Before this period, the Nuer were quite egalitarian, since tribal elders would make a 
collective decision. As noted above, particularly with respect to the rule of law, elders 
play a crucial role and have de facto control over rulings in all three of the tribes. Elders 
play an important role in the internal decision making structure of their tribe, and play a 
similar role in the external affairs of the tribe. Although final agreements were formally 
reached between chiefs, tribal elders would have already negotiated and come up with a 
decision. Cattle were given as bloodwealth to the relatives of the deceased, and cattle that 
might have been slain in the conflict were replaced.  
 In the Murle and Nuer tribes, elders well informed about the raids conducted by 
tribal youths, since these youths were an integral part of the community. This allowed 
elders to guide the process of cattle raiding, ensuring that the youth did not use violent 
methods. If conflict arose as a result of a raid, the elders resolved it before the conflict 
spiraled. Dinka elders were often less aware of raids, since they occurred while youth 
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were away in cattle camps. For this reason, Dinka elders were not involved in facilitating 
raids; however, if a conflict began to escalate, they were brought in to resolve it.  
4.8 Conclusion: Indigenous solutions to the current conflict 
During the escalation of cattle raiding after 2009, no active measures have been 
taken to resolve the conflicts among the tribes in Jonglei State. Those who have raided 
cattle have not been punished, creating a perception of impunity from state laws. In order 
to address the shortfalls of prosecution in regards to cattle raiding, local solutions could 
be implemented to complement the national legal system. Given the lack of trust among 
the Dinka, Lou-Nuer and Murle, none of the tribes will implement a solution that is seen 
to give them a strategic disadvantage. The purpose of this chapter has been to establish 
the specifics of the tradition of cattle raiding among the Dinka, Lou-Nuer and Murle 
tribes. A comparative examination of cattle raiding among the Dinka, Lou-Nuer and 
Murle is absent in the existing relevant literature. Through an analysis of this tradition, I 
have identified key aspects of cattle raiding that are no longer practiced. I believe that in 
addition to the current insecurity in Jonglei which has led to an increase in clashes, the 
removal of these aspects has led to an increase in violence when raids occur. If those 
parts of the tradition which have been discontinued could be re-introduced, then a local 
solution could be implemented and used to hold individuals accountable when raiding 
leads to conflict. Due to the lack of trust among tribes, this solution would have to be 
implemented across each tribe equally to assure its success. 
The most likely solution that could be implemented across the tribes involves 
utilizing an indigenous approach to peacemaking. In the post-conflict literature, 
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indigenous peacemaking is defined as “an activity or norm that is locally inspired.”144 
This differs from traditional peacemaking, an approach based on the heritage of the 
group, and practiced over a long period of time. An indigenous solution to the conflicts 
resulting from cattle raids can be inspired by traditional practices, but does not need to be 
traditional. All groups are constantly changing their practices and traditions based on 
current circumstances. As described by MacGinty, “negotiation and renegotiation of 
modes of social operation are embedded practices and provide sites for social innovation 
and exposure to new or externally inspired practices and ideas.”145 In Jonglei, a solution 
that is adapted to the current circumstances must be introduced to address the violence 
from cattle raiding.  
In this chapter, I have identified five practices of cattle raiding that were 
traditionally practiced by tribal groups. These practices can be adapted and implemented 
locally in each of the tribal groups given the similarities in their approach to cattle 
raiding. The most important tradition that must be re-established for any indigenous 
approach to be successful is ensuring that respect for elders is strongly established within 
the Dinka, Lou-Nuer and Murle tribes. Elders have played a critical role in each of the 
tribes, particularly by ensuring that the rule of law is followed. If a process of mediation 
by elders can be reintroduced, trust might develop among the elders of each tribe, leading 
to open channels of communication in the case of conflict. To help re-establish respect 
towards elders, a position similar to that of the age-set captain found in the Murle tribe 
would be beneficial in ensuring that the rules set down by tribal elders are followed. This 
individual would help facilitate communication between the youth and elders, closing a 	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large generational gap. In regards to the practice of cattle raiding –as it is unlikely to be 
eliminated – emphasis on the importance of conducting covert raids would reduce the 
scale of violence. If an individual who stole cattle but did not harm a neighboring tribe 
was celebrated, cultural pressures might gradually lead to a reduction in violence. In 
addition, raids conducted in small groups, as reflected in the ‘best-friend’ practice of the 
Murle tradition, could be conducted more covertly and would represent less of a threat. 
Finally, the payment of bloodwealth when conflict occurred was the most effective way 
to end feuds and should be re-introduced. This analysis of the cattle raiding traditions of 
the Dinka, Lou-Nuer and Murle demonstrates that these five practices have the potential 
to greatly reduce the violent characteristic of current cattle raids. 
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Chapter 5: Insecurity 
5.1 Introduction 
Throughout this thesis, a clear distinction has been made between clashes and 
violence during cattle raids. In the last chapter, I identified some of the important 
traditions that reduced the level of violence when clashes occurred. While I believe that 
the revival of these traditions can reduce violence in Jonglei, current efforts have 
primarily focused on addressing the issues of insecurity in the State. While there are 
many sources of insecurity that have caused an increase in clashes, this chapter focuses 
on three of the most discussed sources of insecurity: bridewealth, environmental changes, 
and small arms and light weapons. The increase in bridewealth costs in Jonglei has been 
cited as a reason for the increase in raids. Youth who have few job prospects turn to cattle 
raiding to obtain a herd large enough to allow them to marry. Environmental changes 
within Jonglei have also increased the number of clashes between tribes. Migration 
patterns have shifted, causing herders to travel farther to find grazing lands and water for 
their cattle. Furthermore, once herders are able to find these crucial resources they are 
often denied access, which causes conflict. These factors have strongly contributed to 
insecurity in Jonglei and an increase in clashes. However, historically both factors were 
also strongly governed by traditional mechanisms that existed within the tribal structure. 
On the other hand, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons is considered by 
chiefs and elders to undermine their influence within the governance of the tribes. In 
attempts to implement the ‘best practices’ in post-conflict reconstruction, international 
and national actors, with the support of tribal elders, have attempted to disarm the citizens 
in Jonglei State numerous times since the end of the Second Civil War. However, 
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disarmament has been unsuccessful, and the proliferation of SALW continues to 
contribute to insecurity within Jonglei State. 
5.2 Bridewealth 
 The rising cost of dowries in South Sudan is often cited as a major source of 
insecurity in the country. The effect of bridewealth in Jonglei has similarly led to an 
increase in the number of clashes, due to the need to acquire more cattle for marriage. In 
2004, the bridewealth needed to marry in the Nuer tribe was approximately forty cattle, 
while 100 cattle had to be paid for by a Dinka.146 In November 2011, it was estimated 
that the dowry prices had increased by 44% since the signing of the CPA in 2005.147 In a 
region such as Jonglei, where as previously mentioned 90% of the population lives on the 
equivalent of a dollar a day, this drastic inflation has led to an increase in raids to obtain 
the cattle needed for marriage. 
 The Dinka in Jonglei have particularly cited bridewealth inflation as a source of 
insecurity.148 This is most likely because Dinka brides require the highest bridewealth of 
all the tribes in Jonglei. Bridewealth, like any other economic factor, fluctuates 
depending on the specific circumstances in the region. This allows the price of 
bridewealth among the different tribes in Jonglei to change irrespective of what the other 
tribes must pay for bridewealth. Therefore, if one tribe has overinflated the cost of a 
bride, the other tribes in the region will not necessarily be affected. As the Dinka hold 
many government posts, wealth among members of the tribe has increased. Given the 
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tradition of polygamy in South Sudan, wealthy men are able to marry multiple women, 
paying high bridewealth prices for each marriage.149  
While successful government officials or businessmen want to pay high 
bridewealth due to the resulting prestige, most young men cannot afford to compete. 
Furthermore, in 2008 it was estimated over half the population in Jonglei consisted of 
men; in addition to the tradition of polygamy, there has been a shortage in the number of 
marriageable women in Jonglei, which has also increased the price of bridewealth.150 
While young men can seek brides outside of their tribe, e.g., in Uganda and Kenya where 
the bridewealth needed is significantly lower, this practice is not culturally encouraged. 
However, it does provide an affordable alternative that, in theory, could reduce the 
necessity of cattle raiding. In this vein, the Shilluk king has limited the bridewealth price 
to ten cattle. As the cultural and religious leader of the Shilluk tribe, one of the major 
tribal groups in South Sudan, the actions of the King are significant. The set price would 
allow both Shilluk youth, and those from surrounding communities such as the Dinka and 
Nuer, to marry without the need of raiding for cattle. However, the comparatively lower 
bridewealth prices could also lead to young men to marry more women, as the cost per 
bride is reduced, which would require an equivalent numbers of cattle. 
While an increase in government officials is part of the reason why dowry prices 
have increased, as these officials are willing to pay higher prices, the more direct cause of 
inflation is parental demands for increased prices. Given the insecurity in Jonglei – both 
human and economic – “parents naturally see it in their best interest to maximize their 
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wealth in exchange for marrying off a daughter.”151 A strong reliance on dowries for 
daughters has had strong negative effects on women in South Sudan. In many cases, their 
economic importance has led them to be viewed as property. 
The economic importance of daughters within the culture of many tribes in South 
Sudan is not new. However, current trends have led to various limitations on female 
youth. The importance of dowry wealth has led to women being given little control over 
their lives. Furthermore, the commodification of women is increasingly regarded as 
modern day slavery.152 Marriage in Jonglei is no longer a balanced relationship, and 
women whose families receives large bridewealth payments do not stand on the same 
level as their husbands, as they have been ‘bought’ and have no say in the marriage. The 
increased prices of bridewealth have also led to an increase in domestic violence in South 
Sudan. Increasing violence by husbands has been reported, but more disturbingly there is 
a trend of parents using violence to control their daughters; particularly in order to ensure 
that they do not associate with other men.153 Given the constant threat of violence, some 
young girls have committed suicide to escape absolute control by parents and husbands. 
Although it is unlikely that the price of brides will decrease, given the continued 
insecurity, the conditions of young women must be addressed. Girls are being married off 
at very young ages; once they hit puberty, their economic potential is the highest. Young 
women, if married directly after puberty, can have more children than a woman married 
later in life. The more children a woman has, the higher the economic gains for the 
husband and father, as he can marry off his daughters in the future for high bridewealth 
payments. Therefore, the marriage of women in South Sudan has become a cycle 	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whereby the payment of high bridewealth prices leads to the eventual receipt of high 
levels of bridewealth. For the same economic reasons, men are also getting married at a 
younger age. In the past, men would get married after they had served as cattle guards, in 
their 20s and 30s, to only three or four wives.154 Given that bridewealth requirements are 
quite onerous, young men try to marry early in order to have more children and increase 
their long-term wealth. Furthermore, young men have also begun to marry more women 
earlier on in order to have more children. 
Bridewealth payments are unlikely to decrease in the near future. Not only is the 
increased insecurity causing the price to remain high, but there is also no incentive for 
elites and tribal leaders to attempt to reduce prices. Both the elites within Jonglei State 
and tribal leaders (chiefs and elders) have an abundance of cattle and many daughters.155 
This means that they can afford to pay high bridewealth for wives, as well as demand 
high prices for their daughters. Furthermore, it is questionable whether tribal chiefs and 
elders would even be in a position to reduce the prices of brides. With the breakdown of 
traditional governance structures, the ability they once had to set bridewealth prices has 
eroded, making the costs more dependent on economic rather than cultural factors.156 
While this section has focused on negative developments, one generally positive trend is 
that more young girls are being educated. This is because an educated girl’s family can 
receive more cattle in the form of bridewealth. However, due to the payment of high 
bridewealth prices by government officials, parental control over daughters, and a lack of 
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actions taken by elites to deal with the situation, the current trend in increased 
bridewealth requirements is likely to continue. 
5.3 Environmental Changes 
 Changes in the environment in Jonglei have had a major effect on the migration 
patterns of the Dinka, Lou-Nuer, and Murle. There is a strong perception among the 
population that the amount of grazing land and water has decreased.157 This has caused 
the patterns of migration to shift. Whereas previous migrations were well established in 
Jonglei, allowing a tribe to know when and where other tribes would be migrating 
through their territory, current trends have led to unpredictability in migration. 
Essentially, a tribe must travel farther to reach grazing lands and water and, due to the 
paucity of these supplies, remain on these territories for longer periods of time. This 
problem has led to an increase in the number of clashes in Jonglei for two reasons. First, 
tribes must travel for longer periods of time, increasing their chances of being attacked on 
the road. Second, tribes have been denied access to grazing lands and water located on a 
rival’s territory. 
 During the dry season from November until March, the Dinka, Lou-Nuer, and 
Murle must migrate in order to provide grazing lands and water for their herds. Due to 
the changing environmental conditions, these migrations must often cover long distances, 
and in some cases travel may last up to four days.158 This has caused migrating groups to 
become more susceptible to attacks, even when protected by security forces. In February 
2013, there was an attack on the annual migration of local Lou-Nuer in Akobo – 
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reportedly by either the David Yau Yau rebel group or members of the Murle tribe.159 
The attack was one of the largest reported since the end of major clashes in March 2012; 
103 civilians were listed as missing or dead, fourteen SPLA officers were killed, and 
thousands of cattle were stolen. What made this attack unique is that the group was being 
escorted by the SPLA, underscoring the inability of the security services to protect the 
civilian population. While migrations have been vulnerable in the past, the presence of 
the military during the attack underscores the danger posed by longer migrations. 
 One of the more direct causes of clashes has been the changing relationship 
between communities which had traditionally shared seasonal pastures. Previously, local 
peace agreements between neighboring tribes had managed tensions between 
communities during seasonal migrations.160 While these treaties tended to be temporary 
and renegotiated on a regular basis, they were very effective in reducing the number of 
clashes. However, cattle raids between neighboring communities have increased 
animosity. This has led to a lack of trust between neighboring tribes, causing traditional 
agreements to be neglected and not re-negotiated. Therefore, there are conflicting 
perceptions by tribes in Jonglei as to which agreements are still in place. Tribes have 
often migrated to traditional pastures only to be denied access. This has led to the use of 
force in order to access grazing lands, which only increases tensions between tribes.161 As 
described in Chapter Two, conflicts over grazing agreements can lead to the quick 
escalation of conflict. In the January 2009 Murle attack on the Lou-Nuer, the primary 
reason for the clash was a disagreement regarding the right of migration into Murle 	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territory. The Lou-Nuer, who had traditionally negotiated this right, expected that 
reduced tensions with the Murle would allow for migration. However, the Murle did not 
believe that the right of grazing had been sufficiently negotiated, leading them to attack 
the Lou-Nuer when they crossed into Murle territory.  
While cycles of conflict occur between each of the tribes in Jonglei, the Lou-Nuer 
have been involved in most of the major clashes that occurred from 2009 until 2012. 
Compared to other tribes in Jonglei, the Lou-Nuer have a strategic disadvantage that 
causes them to repeatedly come into conflict with neighboring tribes.162 During the dry 
season from November to April, the Lou-Nuer have to migrate in order to find grazing 
land for their herds of cattle. To the north are the Jikany-Nuer; both the Dinka and 
Gawaar-Nuer are located to the west; and in the south are the Murle.163 For this reason, 
tensions between the Lou-Nuer and other tribes tend to be quite high, as the Lou-Nuer 
often migrate into the territory of other tribes. The insecurity caused by changing 
environmental factors has increased the number of small-scale clashes. Furthermore, the 
youth herding the cattle are usually armed, causing the seasonal migration to be perceived 
as a threat.  
5.4 Small Arms and Light Weapons 
 Many studies have examined the effect of small arms and light weapons 
proliferation on the conflict in Jonglei. These studies generally agree that SALW are one 
of the main contributors to the high levels of insecurity in Jonglei State as the Dinka, 
Lou-Nuer, and Murle are all heavily armed. The proliferation of SALW is blamed for 
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causing clashes to become more deadly. 164  For this reason several disarmament 
campaigns have been attempted in Jonglei since the signing of the comprehensive peace 
treaty in 2005.165 These campaigns have been carried out on an ad-hoc basis in order to 
respond to outbreaks of conflict between tribes.166 Although disarmament seems to have 
been the preferred method of responding to the conflict in Jonglei, it is widely agreed that 
it has had no success in reducing conflict. Those campaigns that were the most 
‘successful’ only created “a buffer between episodes of violence.”167 The most recent 
campaign was conducted in 2012 following the cessation of hostilities between the white 
army and the Murle.  
In contrast to previous campaigns, the SPLA had been able to mobilize a large 
force, allowing it to conduct a fairly simultaneous disarmament of Dinka, Lou-Nuer and 
Murle.168 Previously, disarmament was carried out by a smaller SPLA force, causing 
different tribes to be disarmed at different times. Until the most recent disarmament, the 
unequal implementation of disarmament was regarded as a cause of clashes. When one 
tribe was being disarmed and vulnerable, its neighbours were still armed and conducted 
raids to take advantage of the defenseless tribe. Although there has not been a major clash 
since the 2012 disarmament, the attack by the Murle on the Lou-Nuer in February 2013 is 
partly due to the security vacuum that was created by disarmament.169 Lou-Nuer civilians 
were being escorted by the SPLA due to the fact that they had been disarmed, and 
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therefore had no ability to defend themselves if attacked. In theory, if disarmament of the 
entire civilian population had been achieved simultaneously, then the presence of the 
SPLA should have deterred any conflict during migration. However, during the 
disarmament process, many raiders either hid their weapons or fled while the 
disarmament was taking place.170 Therefore, many of the individuals most likely to be 
involved in the conflict were not disarmed. 
 Furthermore, any attempts to disarm the population were effectively nullified 
since it is relatively easy to obtain SALWs. Many weapons are available as a result of the 
Second Civil War. Even though disarmament programs targeted weapons distributed 
among the civilian population, many were not collected as stores of weapons were hidden 
during the campaign. In addition, the SALW collected were not properly stored. They 
were often stolen due to a lack of security, and used to rearm the local populations in the 
wake of increasing violence.171 Furthermore, there are many local traders in the area who 
smuggle arms from neighboring countries such as Ethiopia, and the costs are relatively 
low due to the large supply. In both the Murle and Lou-Nuer communities, a Kalashnikov 
assault riffle costs approximately three cattle, and 200-500 rounds of ammunition can be 
purchased with a single cow.172 
 As in the case of previously discussed source of insecurity, there has been elder 
involvement in attempts to disarm the population. The proliferation of SALW among 
youth is viewed as undercutting the authority of tribal leaders. Rand and LeRiche argue 
that the reason that elders and local chiefs have actively worked with the SPLA to disarm 
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the population was re-establish their influence within their tribes.173 The ability to re-
establish control over youth, which has greatly deteriorated since the end of the Second 
Civil War, would be a convincing reason to support civilian disarmament. While more 
research is needed to determine whether or not this is the primary driving factor, there has 
been strong tribal chief and elder buy-in to the SPLA disarmament campaigns. If 
disarmament would increase the influence of elders, then independence of youth from the 
tribal structures would decrease in turn. Youth in Jonglei have been less supportive of 
disarmament programs; some youth have even left tribal communities to avoid the 
process. Similar research would need to be conducted to determine whether or not the 
lack of youth participation in the disarmament campaigns are due to perceived threat to 
the independence of youth from tribal structures. 
5.5 Conclusion 
Both bridewealth and environmental changes have strongly contributed to 
insecurity in Jonglei, and therefore an increase in clashes. However, under traditional 
governance structures, mechanisms were in place to reduce violence arising from these 
sources of insecurity. While higher bridewealth prices has led to an increase in raids, 
tribal chiefs and elders were previously able to regulate the price of dowries. Therefore, 
bridewealth prices were determined by cultural factors rather than economic 
considerations. In addition, tribal elders would also decide on the migration patterns 
taken by the community. This allowed them to negotiate rights to grazing land with 
neighboring tribes before the start of migration. Therefore, traditional governance 
structures were able to reduce the causes of clashes due to insecurity.  	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The proliferation of SALW in Jonglei State has not only contributed to insecurity, 
but it has also been cited as decreasing the influence of elders within tribal structures. 
Unlike the bridewealth and environmental factors, elders strongly support programs that 
address the proliferation of SALW such as disarmament. However, attempts at 
disarmament have caused an increase in clashes as certain groups remain armed and 
attack disarmed communities. The perception among tribal chiefs and elders is that they 
could regain their position as leaders within the community if they can disarm the youth. 
While a lack of action by chiefs and elders on the issues of bridewealth and 
environmental factors have caused an increase in clashes, the attempts to address SALW 
proliferation have been unsuccessful, and armed youth continue to come into conflict 
with neighbouring tribes. 
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Chapter 6: Concluding Thoughts 
This thesis has suggested that a new approach should be taken to understand the 
shift in the practice of cattle raids in Jonglei State. Current attempts to address the 
increased violence in Jonglei State have primarily focused on implementing programs 
that target the sources of insecurity. However, as demonstrated in this thesis, insecurity 
has caused an increase in clashes between tribes. These clashes do not necessarily lead to 
violence, but they provide an increased opportunity for violence to occur. I have 
suggested that the breakdown of governance structures, which included the de facto rules 
of cattle raiding and traditional conflict resolution mechanisms, is the primary factor that 
has led to an increase in violence during cattle raids. However, both causal mechanisms 
are strongly connected as the factors of insecurity overlap with the role of traditional 
governance structures. Therefore, while this thesis has built on previous research 
conducted in Jonglei State, further research is needed to test whether the breakdown of 
traditional governance structures has directly influenced the scale of violence.  
Individual factors of insecurity have not led to an increase in clashes. Rather, the 
combination of multiple factors of insecurity has caused the increase in clashes. While 
many factors of insecurity exist in Jonglei State, given that there are currently many 
threats to human security, the factors of insecurity must be related to lead to increased 
clashes. In Chapter Five, the factors of bridewealth, environmental changes, and SALW 
were given as examples of the major causes of insecurity in Jonglei State. The factors of 
bridewealth and environmental changes, if combined, would most likely not lead to an 
increase in clashes. However, the rising bridewealth costs, coupled with the proliferation 
of SALW, would likely lead to clashes. With rising bridewealth costs, youth must find a 
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way to acquire large numbers of cattle to marry. If youth possess weapons, then they 
have protection if they raid cattle from neighboring tribes. Therefore, the combination of 
the possession of SALW and increased bridewealth prices likely leads to an increase in 
clashes. 
The combinations of factors of insecurity that could lead to an increase in clashes 
are almost endless. With potential factors of insecurity such as the proliferation of 
SALW, the economics of bridewealth, environmental effects on grazing lands and 
migration, as well as factors that were not discussed in detail in this thesis such as 
political interests in the conflict, the failure of the security sector to respond to conflicts, 
and the lack of infrastructure, there are many possibilities for an increase in clashes 
between tribes. Taken alone, the proliferation of arms, the failure of the security sector to 
respond when clashes occur, and the lack of infrastructure that would allow the 
deployment of institutional responses to clashes combine to form a tempting combination 
that could lead to clashes. Due to the increase in the number of factors of insecurity, the 
factor of unpredictability alone could lead to an increase in clashes. As described in the 
parable of the tribe, the fear of any potential hostility from surrounding tribes will result 
in preemptive hostile actions. 
When clashes occur, this thesis has demonstrated that the breakdown of 
traditional governance structures has led to an increase in violence during cattle raids. 
Previously, tribal elders were able to implement the de facto rules of raids, and acted as 
mediators through established conflict resolution mechanisms when cycles of violence 
broke out. The stability that resulted from this traditional governance structure 
contributed to the tradition of cattle raiding remaining relatively non-violent. However, 
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due to the effects of the Second Sudanese Civil War and the secession of South Sudan, 
traditional governance structures have broken down. Due to the drastic changes that have 
occurred in South Sudan, the traditional governance structures described in Chapter Four 
cannot be re-introduced. Rather, the traditions would have to be adapted to modern tribal 
life in Jonglei State. Therefore, although tribal elders have tried to regain control of their 
tribes, the independence of youth from tribal structures has made this very unlikely. 
Youth would have to be integrated into tribal decision-making processes, as they would 
most likely not submit to tribal governance if they were excluded. 
Throughout this thesis, particularly in Chapter Four, I have identified some 
important traditions that could be reintroduced to help establish indigenous solutions to 
address the lack of governance in Jonglei. The most crucial tradition that should be re-
introduced is the use of bloodwealth as compensation. As demonstrated in Warrap, Unity, 
and Lake states, this tradition could be modified, requiring that a set amount of cattle be 
paid if an individual is convicted of a crime related to cattle raiding. If this indigenous 
approach is implemented, violence during cattle raids would decrease, as committing 
crimes would negate any gains made during raids. Due to the importance of cattle as 
discussed in section 4.2, the potential loss of large numbers of cattle is detrimental due to 
the importance of cattle in tribal life in Jonglei State.  
If the issue of governance in Jonglei is addressed, then cattle raiding could revert 
back to a relatively non-violent tradition, as mechanisms to address conflict and reduce 
violence would be in place. However, current practices in post-conflict reconstruction 
have led to a highly operationalized approach, with a focus on creating formal institutions 
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that will provide peace and security. This creates an atmosphere in which organic forms 
of justice and peacemaking have become operationally sidelined.  
The operational focus within the field of conflict resolution is derived from the 
liberal peace approach, which is highly institutionalized. International actors and donors 
have created a one size fits all checklist that has been applied to different types of post-
conflict situations. This IKEA approach to establishing a stable post-conflict state is 
based on an analysis of the most successful programs and institutions that were 
implemented in previous efforts.174 While this approach does address previous mistakes 
that were made in an effort to improve the overall reconstruction efforts, it does not 
always address the individual needs of each post-conflict situation. 
The liberal peace model has four main strands: victor’s, institutional, 
constitutional, and civil peace.175 Each of these contributes to re-establishing governance 
in post-conflict societies; however, the international agenda focuses on the effects of 
governance, security, and institutions. In order to establish a more operational definition 
of the liberal peace, it will be understood as:  
the concept, condition and practice whereby leading states, international 
organizations and international financial institutions promote their version of 
peace through peace-support interventions, control of international financial 
architecture, support for state sovereignty and the international status quo.176 
 
 The liberal peace approach is not unalterable even though post-conflict operations 
by international actors seem rigid. It has adapted, changing as the international consensus 
has evolved. International advocacy groups and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
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have applied pressure to states and international organizations, such as the United 
Nations, that promoted a unified approach to human rights. Furthermore, various actors 
in post-conflict reconstruction and state building have embraced the importance of human 
security.177 The academic literature has begun to form a consensus on the importance of 
local involvement in the reconstruction process. It describes local justice and customary 
laws as complementary to other transitional justice mechanisms such as tribunals and 
truth and reconciliation commissions.178 Furthermore, international actors often embrace 
the inclusion of local programs and approaches, at least rhetorically.179 For this reason, it 
is possible that if enough pressure builds up to support formalized hybrid models, they 
could be included within the liberal peace agenda. 
Hybridity, with regards to the concept of peace, refers to a system in which both 
the international and local approaches to peace building are engaged, with the intended 
result to be complementary, both approaches making equal gains. 180  The current 
application of these hybrid programs is not systematic, rather they are applied in an ad-
hoc fashion, and only when it is most beneficial for international organizations and donor 
states. When hybrid approaches are not included as part of the international agenda, the 
application of an ‘informal hybrid system’ can be observed during post-conflict 
reconstruction. I would argue that the current system within Jonglei represents an 
informal hybrid approach because there is still interaction at some level between local 
and international actors. In Jonglei, reoccurring disarmament campaigns are strongly 
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favored by the international community and donor countries. In addition, these 
campaigns are implemented by the national government and receive support from local 
tribal leaders.  
In certain cases, local actors do not feel that international efforts address their 
needs, and in response implement their own post-conflict reconstruction programs. This 
involves local actors interacting with (or at least observing) international efforts, 
evaluating them, and responding to them. While this is not done in conjunction with other 
international programs or funded by the international community, these local programs 
often complement institutional approaches to post-conflict reconstruction. The current 
system is not a formal hybrid system because both local and international approaches do 
not engage with one another on a systematic level, nor are the gains equal.  
In order to address the issue of governance in Jonglei, local actors will have to be 
active participants in the conflict resolution processes. The inclusion of these actors in the 
planning stages of conflict resolution would address many of the shortfalls that have been 
caused by a lack of local support for programs in Jonglei. Furthermore, local actors 
sometimes have ideas about approaches to conflict resolution that formal institutions 
might not consider. When asked how to address the conflict between different tribes, Paul 
Omandi noted that local participants believed that the GOSS would have to take a greater 
role in implementing programs such as community consultations, peace meetings, 
mediation between the different tribes, and negotiating new treaties.181 However, it is also 
possible that these local actors will respond to the vacuum in governance by 
implementing programs on a local level. Traditional governance structures emerged due 	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to the lack of formal governance in Jonglei. While there is now a formal government, 
there is currently a lack of governance. Therefore, it is possible that indigenous peace 
processes could be implemented in order to fill the void of governance, complementing 
the current efforts by the GOSS to address the issue of insecurity. While governance must 
be addressed to reduce the scale in violence, solutions that address both insecurity and the 
breakdown of traditional governance structures will have to be introduced in order to 
provide long-term peace and stability in Jonglei State.  
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